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Abstract 
Regarding human well-being Kant is explicit in his rejection of it as a source of moral 
obligations or moral goodness. Well-being, Kant writes, is a reference to sensible 
agreeableness and gratification that is empirically contingent states and preferences that 
cannot in itself merit any moral worth or obligations. The will as good in itself is not only 
considered the only unlimited good but also the condition of any other good, even of well-
being. 
 Well-being as comfort, pleasure, welfare, happiness or other considerations of our 
sensible needs and preferences is what I will call a narrow use of the term well-being, and in 
this essay I am still holding the Kantian conclusion that any kind of well-being in this regard 
cannot constitute moral value, obligate us to action or determine our will. On the other hand 
there is what I will call a wide use of the term where well-being is to be understood as 
"wellness of what constitutes our very being", using the term well-being in its most wide and 
literal sense. This wide use of the term is inspired from Amartya Sen's Capabilities Approach, 
and while Kant himself did not use well-being in this way I will argue that this concept fits 
perfectly with his moral doctrine, helping us to understand Kant better and to place his moral 
theory closer to other theories that has well-being and human flourishing at its core. In this 
essay I will approach Kant's moral philosophy by assessing it from a perspective of what, on 
his account, is constitutive of the human condition and subsequently how we are to evalute 
the success, quality, or "well-ness" of a human being in virtue of how individuals live up to 
this standard.
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Introduction	  
 
In this paper I want to argue for a reading of Kant's moral philosophy where I am placing it 
within a context of well-being as "wellness of what constitutes our very being", using the 
term well-being in its most wide and literal sense. I will approach Kant's moral philosophy by 
assessing it from a perspective of what, on his account, is constitutive of the human being and 
subsequently how we are to evalute the success, quality, or "well-ness" of a human being in 
virtue of how individuals live up to this standard. Initially, arguing that Kant's moral theory 
could be read in terms of well-being might seem like a ludicrous attempt as Kant is very 
explicit in his rejection of giving human well-being a role or any importance in his moral 
philosophy. However, my project is not ment to argue on Kant's usual use of the term. Well-
being as comfort, pleasure, welfare, happiness or other considerations of only our sensible 
needs and preferences is what I will call a narrow use of the term, which will be denoted as 
well-beingN from this point on, and I am still holding the Kantian conclusion that any kind of 
well-being in this regard cannot constitute moral value, obligate us to action or determine our 
will. On the other hand there is what I will call a wide use of the term, which will be denoted 
as well-beingW from this point on, which is the one I was describing at the very beginning of 
this introduction. In his book Inequality Reexamined Amartya Sen writes that "the well-being 
of a person can be seen in terms of the quality (the 'well-ness', as it were) of a person's 
being", so if we make an attempt to identify what constitute "being a person" or "being a 
human being" then "an evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assessment of 
these constitutive elements."1 Well-beingW is then arguing what is constitutive of being a 
human being, and "more well-being" means a higher quality, or success, of living up to the 
standard of what it is to be human. Conversely terms like dehumanization, deprevation and 
degrading regarding morality and humanity are terms that describe a loss of the quality or 
success of living up to mentioned standard. 
 I am taking inspiration from this idea and definition of well-being from Sen and thus 
want to test Kant's moral theory by reading and interpreting his moral writing within this 
conceptual approach. As opposed to the narrow use of the term that we find in Kant well-
beingW is not limited to just the sensible considerations of our existence, meaning we can 
include Kant's arguments and discourse on pure reason, autonomy and the good will as 
intrinsic elements of what it means to be human and what kind of life this will lead us to. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sen, Amartya. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, p.39 
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 Further, as human well-beingW cannot be sufficiently assessed simply as pure reason I 
think this approach also will be a good and useful way to turn attention to the Kantian 
doctrine of virtue and how, as rational animals, we are to relate to-and cultivate our sensible 
aspect through autocracy. By doing this I believe we can easier acknowledge and appreciate 
both the binding force and the applicability of Kant's moral theory in our everyday lives; an 
applicability that it has so many times been accused of neglecting. Kant's moral framework 
is famously known as being deontological, or duty ethics, and while I am not challenging this 
classification I do believe that the traditional seperation of duty ethics and virtue ethics are 
not, atleast in Kant's case, warranted. It tends to turn the attention away from Kant's writing 
about moral character and the importance of cultivating ourselves both as a rational and as a 
sensible being, aspects of his theory which is amply overlooked when criticized but that is 
essential to understand a more complete picture of Kant's moral philosophy. I will thus also 
argue that for Kant virtue is the active project of realizing the human nature in accordance 
with duty, making virtue a central concept regarding well-beingW. 
 I believe that looking at Kant's moral theory in terms of well-beingW (or human 
flourishing, which I take to be interchangeable terms) can provide a useful approach when 
reading and discussing Kant to 1) reject common criticism of Kant's moral philosophy that I 
find to be either misplaced or based on a shallow and inadequate reading of Kant, 2) to better 
understand both the necessity and the applicability of Kant's ethics as duty to the moral law in 
both our character and our everyday social lives and, perhaps most importantly, 3) to show 
how Kant can meet many of the considerations and worries that theories of well-being and 
human flourishing are ment to cover, theories that traditionally are considered as competing 
and incompatible with the Kantian framework. 
 To help make this assessment of Kant's moral theory in term of well-beingW I will be 
using the Capabilities Approach as presented by Amartya Sen and Elizabeth Anderson to 
help guide the discourse. I will be identifying what I take to be some important similarities 
between this approach and my reading of the Kantian moral framework and, of course, also 
highlight how they differ. The central comparisons will be the metaphysical assessment of 
what constitutes being a human being, well-being and its normativity in terms of living up to 
their respective assessments of mentioned constitutive elements and having the capabilities 
and efficacy to pursue and achieve said well-being. 
 As the Capabilities Approach is a theory of social justice it would initially seem more 
intuitive to compare it to Kant's doctrine of rights. However my interest in this paper is to 
defend Kant's moral framework by arguing for a reading of it through the concept of well-
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being, of a constitutive standard of our very being where our "wellness" is an assessment of 
how well we live up to this standard, and for this purpose I find the Capabilities Approach 
useful to guide the discussion as the concept of well-beingW is inspired from this approach. I 
believe that this concept of well-being will not only help revealing the more attractive 
features of Kant's moral framework - features which I think can easily meet some of the most 
serious criticisms toward his moral theory - but that it also will make the theory easier to 
grasp in general. Because of this I think it will be helpful to review and identify similarities 
with a theory that already has such a concept at its core, meaning that I am not primarily 
intending to compare the two theories but rather present the Capabilities Approach to help the 
discourse, showing how Kant's moral theory compares on what is initially believed to be a 
competing and incompatible conceptual area. In the end this paper is about reading and 
defending the moral doctrine of Kant. 
 If we are to identify a plausible reading of Kant's moral philosophy in terms of well-
beingW and capabilities to further pursue and achieve well-beingW - a reading that will not 
only show Kant's moral philosophy as compatible with theories that emphasizes well-being 
and human flourishing but that it also will be a strong and capable challenger to them on their 
own field - then we firstly need to be able to make an account of well-being in terms of what 
a human life is, of what constitutes our very being and the lives we live. Second we need to 
make an account of having capabilities to pursue well-being that is connected to our 
constitutive elements, meaning it represents having real opportunities in one's own agency 
that is also constitutive of what we are and so is also normative to us. Third and lastly we 
have to establish these elements within the normative foundation of Kant, showing that they 
are not only permissible according to Kant's moral framework but that they are constitutive of 
what he argues to be our moral obligations. I believe that these three criteria - which are 
criteria in reference to the Capabilities Approach as the guide to assess Kant in terms of well-
beingW - are not only possible but that they are a necessary and fundamental part of Kant's 
moral framework. Kant only presented it differently with a more comprehensive, 
metaphysical account of how and why it is normative. I intend to approach these three criteria 
in the following way: 
 I will use Chapter 1 to establish the relevant academic discussion for my project. 
There I will review the Capabilities Approach as it is presented by Sen and Anderson to 
identify it's main features and normative foundation. I will then take a look at the initial 
challenges and criticisms aimed at Kant's moral philosophy, both in view of its (allegedly) 
incompatability with the conceptual framework of the Capabilities Approach and of its 
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criticism in general. I will then take a quick look at some of the defenders of Kant and their 
arguments that refute the previously mentioned criticisms, explaining how the influence of 
these philosophers lead me to attempting this project in the first place and how it opens up for 
a plausible account of reading and placing Kant within a context of well-beingW. As this 
short, introductory rejection of the criticisms of Kant is only ment to establish the discussion 
and current positions I will use the chapters that follow to make a more complete account and 
defence of Kant' moral philosophy, building on the work of the philosophers that I refer to in 
this chapter. 
 In Chapters 2 and 3 I will undertake the concept of well-being in general and argue 
how this can fit with the Kantian moral framework and conception of what it means to live a 
human life. The central themes will be to argue how well-beingW can be constituted by a 
living thing's function, or internal organization, which is what describes that particulars 
being's form of life. By establishing a normative standard through function, that good and bad 
are measured in virtue of the quality or success of living up to what characterizes one's 
particular kind of life, I will move on to argue that while the human being is both a rational 
and a sensible being where both aspects can be regarded as having their own constitutive 
standards viewed in isolation we are better understood as supersensible beings. For a 
supersensible being reason and sensiblity is not seperate but rather asymmetrically 
intertwined, making out a singel existence that is constituted by the categorical imperative. 
The categorical imperative, I will argue, will turn out to be the standard in which we will be 
able to assess well-beingW and so goodness and badness in human beings. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 will be building on the arguments of chapter 2 and 3 by focusing on 
Kant's account of virtue and the comparison of capabilities to pursue and achieve well-being 
on the one hand and the Kantian conception of autocracy on the other. As I wrote above I 
believe that virtue is a key concept in Kant. When we look beyond the metaphysics of what 
morality is and start to apply it in everyday life Kant's morality quickly becomes one of 
virtue, focusing not merely on the form of our maxims but also our efficacy and character to 
apply them in the sensible world. I will also argue the main differences between capabilities 
from the Capabilities Approach and the Kantian concept of autocracy, of why there is 
important that we are capable in certain respects, the scope of this and how we are obligated 
to promote said capabilities and autocracy. I will further argue why the moral condition of 
supersensible beings is rightly described as duty and self-limitaion and, even though morality 
is primarily a doctrine of duties to oneself we still are, in virtue of the universality of the will, 
subjected to the objective lawfullness of maxims also in interaction with others. All rational 
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beings are connected in virtue of being rational, in virtue of lawfullness, meaning that there 
will also be certain duties of virtue that lead us to promoting capabilities and well-beingW not 
only in ourselves but also in others. 
 The third and last criteria, to establish well-beingW and capabilities within the familiar 
normative foundation of Kant, will be anwered while making the first two accounts as both 
topics will be argued for in terms of duty, the good will and universal law. 
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1. Reviewing relevant litterature and introducing my project 
 
1.1 Sen and Anderson's Capabilities Approach 
As mentioned in the introduction I find it useful to present a general overview of the 
Capabilities Approach before taking a closer look at Kant. In that way we can compare the 
core arguments and features of both moral frameworks and thus assess how they are similar 
and how they are divided in terms of well-beingW. The purpose is that it paves the way for 
reading Kant in terms of well-being as "wellness of what constitutes our very being" by 
familiarizing ourselves with another theory that use this conceptual approach. 
 In his book Inequality Reexamined Amartya Sen is aiming at assessing the concept of 
equality and an approach to meet its normative problems. He states that the central question 
of equality is "equality of what?"2 When considering how diverse human beings can be both 
individually and with the many variables of social and political factors of which equality can 
be judged the term equality becomes a complex question of normativity. His approach to this 
central question is through what he calls "the capability perspective", which can primarily be 
viewed as a doctrine of political philosophy that takes freedom and well-being as its 
normative core, where well-being and freedom to pursue well-being is central and will be 
constitutive of how we are to promote moral equality.3 He writes that the well-being of a 
person can be seen in the quality of the person's being, his or her "well-ness", and living 
could be seen as consisting of a set of interrelated "functionings", which is different ways of 
us being and doing what we are as humans. Relevant functionings can vary from elementary 
things such as being adequately nourished, being in good health and avoid escapable 
morbidity to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking 
part in community life and so on.4 It is then not only sensible needs assosiated with our body 
that matters but also mental needs and activities. Sen's claim is that functionings are 
constitutive of a persons very being, it makes us who and what we are as humans, and an 
evaluation of well-being has to take the form of an assessment of these fundamental 
elements. In other words, functionings make up what a human life is, and so to be robbed or 
depraved of these functionings is to robb and deprave us of what makes us human. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.1 
3 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.39 
4 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.39 
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 Closely related to functionings is capability to function, which represents various 
combinations of functionings (beings and doings) that a person can achieve. Capability thus 
reflects a person's freedom to lead one type of life or another, meaning that increased 
capability is an increased scope of being able to both choose and realize how to live your life, 
to be who you want to be an to do what you want to do. So, while "eating to be nourished" is 
a functioning, the real opportunity to get and consume nourishing food is a corresponding 
capability. For Sen capabilities and freedom is then closely related in this approach as 
capabilities represents the scope of opportunities in our own agency to pursue and achieve 
well-being. 
 Sen further writes that the relevance of a person's capability to his or her well-being 
arises from two distinct yet interrelated considerations. First, if achieved functioning 
constitutes a person's well-being then the capability to achieve functionings (all the 
alternative combinations of functionings a person can choose to have) will constitute the 
persons freedom as real opportunities to have well-being.5 Naturally, a persons "well-being 
freedom" to achieve functionings will be of moral significance if our functionings are 
constitutive of our very being and so it's well-ness. Secondly, well-being and capability is, in 
many cases, directly linked as choosing in itself is a way of well-being, such as when genuine 
choice with real options makes a richer life, or that to be a responsible, independent person 
can be linked to self-respect. Capabilities not only reflect a person's freedom to pursue 
constitutive elements of living but also play a direct role in well-being itself.6 This argument 
has intuitive force as thinking for ourselves, making choices and taking pride and value in 
being independent are familiar and typical human activities. If we regard this as typical, or 
constitutive, of human living then the quality of this will matter for our well-being. 
Capabilities then reflect a person's freedom, or actual ability, to pursue these constitutive 
elements of our being.7 
 It is important to note the difference between well-being and welfare in this 
discussion. For instance, an approach could be to promote welfare that is instrumental to 
yield certain good outcomes, but the focus on well-being in the Capabilities Approach 
promotes "beings and doings" as important in themselves.8 The primary claim is that in 
evaluating well-being the value-objects are functionings and capabilities, not just the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.40 
6 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.41 
7 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.42 
8 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.43 
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achievements or alternatives independent of how they came into being.9 10 It is the freedom in 
itself that is of significance. The value is in doing and being what we are. In so far as 
functionings are constitutive of well-being, capability represents a person's freedom to 
achieve well-being.11 Thus, simply providing people with different social or material goods is 
not sufficient unless it is to secure the minimum required for them to be capable of pursuing 
their own well-being. 
 Another philosopher I want to include regarding the Capabilities Approach is 
Elizabeth Anderson as some of the points she raises will further illuminate features of the 
Capabilities Approach that will be useful to be aware of when assessing Kant in the context 
of well-beingW. 
 In her paper What is the Point of Equality? Anderson argues for what she calls 
"democratic equality". Democratic equality seeks to guarantee all law-abiding citizens 
effective access to the social conditions of their freedom at all times, where claims of Justice 
are in virtue of people being equals, not superiors or inferiors. The fundamental aim is to 
secure everyones freedom, and so the principles of democratic equality cannot presume to 
tell people how to use their opportunities nor to judge how responsible people are for choices 
that lead to unfortunate outcomes.12 She writes that egalitarian theory has its origin from an 
idea of intrinsic worth, where oppression and social relations that discriminate, supress, 
subjugate, exploit and/or dominate others in a hierarchy of value is unjust. Inequality is 
unjust not so much because of unequal distribution of goods but of relations of inferior and 
superior persons. Egalitarian theory rejects such social structures and attitudes as it asserts 
that all persons are of equal moral worth.13 I believe Sen also shares this view of intrinsic 
worth, that our functionings is what constitutes what we do and are and so is equally 
normative for every human being. Democratic equality is then aiming for everyone to live in 
a community where collective self-determination by open discussion among equals is the 
norm, not a hierarchical one where some have to bow and scrape before others as inferiors as 
a condition to have their claims heard.14 
 Freedom is here strongly related to equality as living a free life is to live in a relation 
of equality with others, so to live in an egalitarian community is then to be free from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.46 
10 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.51 
11 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.49 
12 Anderson, Elizabeth S. What is the Point of Equality? in Ethics, Vol. 109, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), p.289 
13 Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, p.312 
14 Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, p.313 
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oppression to participate and to enjoy the goods of society and democratic self-government. 
Freedom is not just "doing what you want without asking permission or being interfered 
with" but is concerned with having the means to do what one wants to do and to be in a social 
relation with others that can make activities that are intrinsically collective, such as political 
life, possible.15 My interpretation of this is that without the means in our own person, or in 
other words without capabilities, we are not truly free in any meaningful way and thus we 
ought to promote-and facilitate for capabilities. This interpretation is supported when 
Anderson continues on the concept of capabilities. A person's capabilities consist of the sets 
of functionings that a person can achieve given the personal, material and social resources 
available. Capabilities measure not actually achieved functionings but a person's freedom to 
achieve valued functionings. More freedom means a greater range of effectively accessible, 
different opportunities that a person has for functioning or leading a life that the person 
values the most. The egalitarian aim, Anderson writes, should then be to aim for everyone to 
be secured the social conditions of their freedom in terms of capabilities.16 
 A problem that arises in this approach is to identify which capabilities society have an 
obligation to equalize and facilitate for, but I will not undertake this question as the scope of 
this paper will be how Sen and Kant can argue for the normativity of capabilities and well-
being and what the content and concequences of these concepts will be. What is of main 
interest here is the Capabilities Approach's claim that to be capable to function as a human 
being it requires effective access to the means of sustaining ones biological existence, such as 
food, shelter, clothing and medical care; access to basic conditions of human agency such as 
knowledge of one's circumstances and options, the ability to deliberate about means and ends 
and the psychological conditions of autonomy, including the self-confidence to think and 
judge for oneself and to have freedom of thought and movement. Further, Anderson writes 
that to have access to means of production, education and freedom of occupational choice is 
important to function in a social community in any meaningful way.17 These are all regarded 
as morally valuable instances because our functionings and so capabilities are constitutive of 
our very being, of what we fundamentally are and do, and human beings have intrinsic worth 
as what we are. Well-being and the normativity of well-being and freedom to pursue well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, p.315 
16 Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, p.316 
17 Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, p.317-318 
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being is based on this, so what we ultimately owe one another in this approach is the social 
conditions that secure the freedoms people need to function as equal citizens.18 
 
1.2 Initial challenges and criticisms 
While neither Sen nor Anderson explicitly argues against Kant the Capabilities Approach is 
usually seen as having a fundamentally different set of values and considerations than that of 
Kant's moral framework and is so seen as a competing and incompatible moral theory. If we 
were to only read Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in particular, which is his 
most known and read text on morality, this can seem like a very safe claim indeed. 
 Firstly we can identify that both theories place freedom as a central value but they 
have a very different approach to what it is. In the Capabilities Approach freedom is about 
having real opportunities to pursue and achieve well-being. As freedom is connected to 
capabilities (which in turn is combinations of functionings) freedom is contingent on 
different physical and psychological needs and dispositions that we need to meet in order to 
promote and respect well-being. Since these needs and dispositions is also intrinsic of our 
well-being freedom itself becomes a part of our well-being. Reading the Groundwork Kant 
argues for freedom as being autonomous, meaning that as rational beings we are to determine 
our will independent of the causes of the (sensible) world.19 For Kant the sensible world and 
the animal nature of human beings are not only rejected as a source of normativity but are 
also seemingly viewed as distractions of morality, competing with reason for our 
determination and so possibly making us immoral. For many readers this Kantian account is 
not satisfactory as it seems unrealistic or atleast impractical to be guided in this way. It is also 
deemed insufficient because sensible needs do seem to be a fundamental characteristic of 
what we are and so need to be a part of how we are to be guided and how we are to assess the 
well-being of humans. This is a serious criticism that Kantian defenders need to answer, one 
that I will take a closer look at shortly. 
 Further, as I just touched upon, they seem to strongly disagree on the source of 
normativity even though they share an idea of intrinsic value. Kant explicitly writes that the 
ground for obligation must not be sought in the (sensible) nature of the human being or in the 
circumstances of the world in which he is placed.20 While our judgement may be sharpened 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, p. 320 
19 Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 4:453 
20 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:389 
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by experience the moral law, to be a moral law at all, must be from a priori pure reason. This 
is where morality and any normativity can come from and it is from this rational aspect that 
intrinsic and absolute worth is derived; as rational beings we have an inviolable dignity. Any 
considerations of sensible well-being is thus rejected as a source of moral worth. On the other 
hand, Sen and Anderson place intrinsic value in well-being where "well-ness" is an 
assessment, or evaluation, of the constitutive elements of what we are and do when living our 
lives, placing their approach very clearly in our sensible nature and the circumstances of the 
world that affects us. 
 Similar observations and subsequent objections from readers of Kant's Groundwork 
are in abundance, where the interpretation and criticism is often that considerations of well-
being and human flourishing are not even compatible with the Kantian conception of 
morality that rather values duty to principles of reason and straight out rejects sensibility, 
making it a moral theory that promotes inauthentic and impractical human behaviour. One 
such criticism comes from Michael Stocker. His example is that you are being visited by a 
friend while you are hospitalized, believing that he is a genuine friend who cares. You later 
realize that he is simply visiting you because he literally thinks it is his duty.21 The objection 
is that Kantian morality demands that we aim at our duty, not the actual person. The demands 
of duty alienates us from each other and it promotes attitudes of friendship that undermine it. 
Duty is understood as demanding that we detach ourselves from the needs and states of 
particular others and to only being concerned with "doing what's right" as some sort of 
morality robots devoid of any feeling or caring for others. 
 Another example is that raised by Bernard Williams, where a man chooses to save his 
wife from drowning when faced with a situation that forces him to choose between rescuing 
his wife or a stranger. The objection is that the husband has to justify rescuing his wife, 
demanding "one thought to many" of him to assess that it is permissable to save his own wife 
in this kind of situations.22 This implies that your choice to save your wife should be obvious 
and not subject to criticism or being a position you should defend given your relationship as a 
married couple. Even though the situation is tragic, particularly for the unfortunate drowning 
stranger, to value the well-being of your spouse should intuitively be a priority, not to be 
coldly concerned about what is right or wrong independent of whom it is concerned. Such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Stocker, Michael, "The Schizofrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976): 
453-66  
22 My first encounter with the examples of Stocker and Williams and the assesments of them is thanks 
to Ann Margaret Baxley's "Kant's Theory of Virtue", and also Marcia Baron's "Kantian Ethics Almost 
Without Apology" in the case of Stockers. 
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detachment from familiar human relationships that we deem valueable and intrinsic of our 
lives just seem impossible and absurd to demand of us. 
 In Kant's own time Friedrich Schiller interpreted Kant's ethics to suggest that to be 
moral by acting according to duty we have to be averse to doing the necessary action. If we 
were unfortunate enough to like doing what morality would demand of us then the action 
would not have genuine moral value.23 If this is the case then Kantian morality could not 
possibly value well-being and capabilities regarding sensible needs as it would explicitly 
reject any motivation of human emotions, inclinations or needs. It would seem to make moral 
life very strange indeed as you could for instance only eat or drink when you don't feel the 
need for it, or else you would have an inclination and so could not morally endorse it. Would 
you be unlucky enough to become hungry the moral thing to do would seem to be starvation, 
which would not be a very practical or motivating moral doctrine for anyone. 
 Further, feminist writers have also criticized Kantian moral philosophy to focus too 
much on blind duty and not enough on human needs and interdependent relationships that our 
well-being and flourishing depends on. The scenario of horror for the care ethicists, which 
characterizes much of the criticism of ethics based on "blind duty" and principles, is that of 
the biblical Abraham who in obedience to God was willing to sacrifice his son Isaac.24 The 
paradox, Nel Noddings writes, is that duty can demand of us to do something unethical, like 
giving up our own child. "Here, says women, is my child. I will not sacrifice him for God, or 
for the greatest good, or for these ten others. Let us find some other way."25 
 In a similar feminist criticism Tove Pettersen writes that within the framework of 
deontology an agent must do what is mandatory and cannot do what is prohibited, even if it 
results in harming others as most weight is given to avoiding breaking (abstract) rules.26 
From the perspective of deontology, she writes, it is even possible that inflicting harm is 
encouraged in order to conserve the moral rule.27 
 What seems to be shared in all these criticisms is that Kantian moral philosophy is 
centered around duty and principles as being absolute, independent of context, personal 
relationships or personal preferences of a good life. This is deemed insufficient or simply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Baxley, Anne Margaret. 2010. Kant’s Theory of Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p.30 
24 Noddings, Nel. 2013. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics & Moral Education. University of 
California Press, p.43 
25 Noddings, Caring, p.44 
26 Pettersen, Tove. 2008. Comprehending Care: Problems and Possibilities in the Ethics of Care. 
Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, p.120 
27 Pettersen, Comprehending Care, p.121 
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impractical as it distances us from real life challenges and relations and is encouraging us to 
inauthentic and blind behaviour distanced from our natural human needs and intuitions. This 
accusation of being distanced from actual needs and being inauthentic human behaviour not 
only makes a strong case for dividing moral theories of well-being, such as the Capabilities 
Approach, from Kantian morality but also challenges Kantian defenders to show how Kant's 
moral framework can meet these considerations and attitudes that so many of us deem 
intrinsic to morality. So, if the results of Kant's moral theory based on pure reason and duty 
do lead to a rejection of our sensible aspect and the needs that come with it then this essay 
would be a rather futile project. Fortunately, these readings and interpretations of Kant are 
not necessarily adequate and might even give a wrong or atleast misguided impression of its 
metaphysical constitution, core arguments and what it all entail. 
 
1.3 Initial rejection of the challenges and criticisms 
The idea that first led me to this project was that there seemed to be an intuitive similarity 
between capabilities as having real opportunities in ones own agency and Kantian virtue as 
autocracy. The best way to characterize the difference between autonomy and autocracy, 
according to Kantian defender Ann Margaret Baxley, is that autonomy is the legislative 
power, the one that makes good maxims while autocracy is the executive power, the one that 
enforces and enacts the maxims28 rendering the agent efficatious and so consistent as both a 
willing and an acting agent that can make changes in the world as a cause. It is not enough to 
only know what is good and right and to make a decision based on this; we also have to be 
able to act on it and be a cause in the empirical world. In the Doctrine of Virtue Kant 
explicitly writes that we have a duty to cultivate our natural powers of spirit, body and mind 
as means to all sorts of possible ends, owing to ourselves not to stay idle and "rust away" our 
natural predispositions and capacities that our reason can someday use.29 Even though Kant 
claims that we cannot derive the source of normativity from the human sensible nature or the 
circumstances of the world that we are situated in these are still important normative 
considerations. After all, the world that we are situated in is the world in which we act, and so 
what we do and why we do it must be in reference to these circumstances. Kant did not forget 
or tried to deny this. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Baxley, Kant’s Theory of Virtue, p.59 
29 Kant, Immanuel, Mary J. Gregor, and Roger J. Sullivan. 1996. The Metaphysics of Morals. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6:444 
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 In a related subject Christine Korsgaard writes that conformity to the categorical 
imperative is what renders us autonomous while conformity to the hypothetical imperative is 
what renders us efficacious.30 Both principles together are necessary for us if we are to be 
acting at all because they both are constitutive principles of action.31 Even though freedom is 
by being autonomous, without the hypothetical imperative we are not really acting in a 
complete sense. Kant writes that hypothetical imperatives represents necessity of a possible 
action as a means to achieve something else that one wills32, and whoever wills an end also 
wills the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power.33 If we are to pursue 
an end we also necessarily have to will the means to bring it about, meaning that we must be 
able to be succesful at the means if the end is to be realized. If not then we are not really 
attempting to make a change in the world as a cause and so willing would simply be reduced 
to mere wishing or daydreaming. This also implies that the scope of possible good maxims 
are limited by our current capabilities, meaning that if my current states of body and mind 
doesn't make any means possible to achieve the end I want to pursue then I cannot, in a 
practical sense, pursue and realize that end. Conversely, an increase in abilities and capacities 
in mind and body means a larger scope of moral agency, increasing my ability to affect the 
world as a cause instead of simply being left reactive and subjected to whatever happens 
around me. 
 A further implication of this is that the categorical imperative and the hypothetical 
imperative is intertwined by being a simultanious necessity of moral agency. Korsgaard 
writes that the hypothetical imperative is not really a seperate principle at all but it rather 
captures an aspect of the categorical imperative; it represents the facts that our laws must be 
practical laws34, meaning that by being guided by it necessarily means that we must be able 
to (autonomously) use our sensible being to make changes in the empirical world. Thus, 
failing to be efficacious in the sensible world means also failing to be autonomous as a 
rational being existing and acting in the sensible world. 
 As I am writing about our empirical aspect and the will there is another interesting 
element to Kant's doctrine of virtue that relates to the previous considerations. A point of 
departure for Sen is that well-being and capabilities must be evaluated by what we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Korsgaard, Christine M. 2009. Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p.83 
31 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, xii 
32 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:414 
33 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:417 
34 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, p.70 
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fundamentally are, or in other words of what living a human life fundamentally consists of. 
The claim is that functionings are constitutive of a person's being as it is what we are and 
what we do (being and doing). There is a similar, though not at all identical argument to be 
found in Kant that is bit complex but definetely worth the attention. 
 Kant writes that we can view the human being under two attributes; firstly as the 
sensible being that is the human animal, and second as an intelligible being, meaning we are 
endowed with inner freedom as a being with reason.35 Korsgaard writes that reason, as she 
understands it, is a power we have in virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness where we 
make grounds for our beliefs and actions and so can control and direct them.36 Kant also 
seems to share this view. He writes that reason is to determine the human being as a cause to 
actions in the sensible world37, and further that only a rational being has the capacity to act in 
accordance with the representation of laws, or principles, and so has a will. Reason is 
required to derivate laws (as opposed to mechanically follow instincts of our animality), and 
so the will is simply practical reason.38 The will is then this power of self-conscious activity, 
the sphere of freedom and self-government that can make grounds for our beliefs and actions, 
and this is how we can direct them as being a cause in the world; we do it by acting according 
to laws, not sensibly determined impulses. This means that while our sensibility registers 
information about the world we can determine ourselves not by subjective inclinations but by 
the universal activity of having a will. To do this we must conform to the law of practical 
reason, which is what Kant call the moral law, or the categorical imperative. This leads us 
back to Baxley's reading of Kant. Failure to acquire autonomy and autocracy is to surrender 
one's authority over oneself, becoming a "plaything"' of the forces and impressions of the 
sensible world, allowing oneself to be dependent on the chance of circumstances instead of 
being subjected to one's own free will.39 Having a free will is not detachment or suppression 
of sensibility; it is just not being determined by it. Yet, even though Kant initially seems to 
have a rather bleak view on natural preferences it has to be noted that inclinations are not in 
themselves bad. The thing is that they are not intrinsic of the activity of willing and so are not 
to meddle in it but rather be subjugated to it. What Kant objects to in the non-autocratic 
person is not that she has inclinations but that she gives them an authority and privileged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:418 
36 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, p.xi 
37 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:418 
38 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:412 
39 Baxley, Kant’s Theory of Virtue, p.54 
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status that they do not merit in a rational being.40 Still, Kant also writes that we are not only 
an intelligible being but also a sensible being. At first it might seem that Kant expresses a 
view where we are to reject our feelings and inclinations but Baxley writes that the Kantian 
autocratic agent is one who doesn't exaggerate or suppress her feelings and inclinations, nor 
is she moved or (seriously) tempted by feelings or inclinations to disturb the authority of self-
rule.41 Acting according to duty while doing it with a cheerful disposition is a sign of moral 
integrity while grudgingly or resistantly acting according to duty indicates a lacking virtue in 
one's character.42 She writes that such a virtuous character involves a well-developed sensible 
nature that is dependent on three factors: First we have to control unruly feelings and 
inclinations, second we have to maintain feelings and inclinations that accord with duty, and 
third we have to cultivate further our natural capacities to feelings and inclinations that 
favour duty. With these three functions together we get a more adequate and complete picture 
of Kantian virtue and so his moral doctrine. Our sensible aspect is then also constitutive of 
what we are, but there are limitations in how we are to relate to it in virtue of the moral law.  
 According to these rather short and introductory defending accounts of Kant it 
becomes much clearer that we can start working out a plausible account of reading and 
placing Kant within a context of well-beingW. In short, well-beingW of the individual human 
being in Kant would be constituted by being autonomous and efficacious as the "well-ness" 
of our being is to let reason keep its authority and for our sensible being to be in a (healthy) 
state to be able to cheerfully support reason under its authority to determine our actions. 
"Well-ness" is then not just our sensibility and our reason evaluated seperately but that they 
are in the correct relation with each other. Having capabilities in our own agency becomes 
normative and relevant as we must have the necessary efficacy to act on our maxims, and 
increased capabilities in our mind, body and spirit means a wider scope of possible means 
and ends that we can undertake, moving us further in the direction of "moral perfection". If 
both our intelligible and sensible being is what makes us human then respecting humanity as 
an end in itself is to respect and promote well-being and capabilities in oneself and others. Or 
atleast this is what I will attempt to argue in the following chapters, aiming at making a much 
more extensive account of Kant's moral theory within this context of well-being, building on 
the work and inspiration from Christine Korsgaard, Anne Margaret Baxley and Robert 
Louden.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Baxley, Kant’s Theory of Virtue, p.68 
41 Baxley, Kant’s Theory of Virtue, p.75 and p.82 
42 Baxley, Kant’s Theory of Virtue, p.102 
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2. Well-ness and organized existence 
 
2.1 Well-being in Kant 
As mentioned in the introduction, a key concept for this project will be the division of well-
beingN and well-beingW. While we can find the latter used in Sen and the Capabilities 
Approach the first one is prevalent in Kant. 
 Since the concept of well-being here is ment to be moral standard we can begin with 
Kant's metaphysical rejection of well-being as a source of moral value. After all, in the 
Groundwork he writes that his aim is to work out a pure moral philosophy that is "cleansed of 
everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology" and that the ground 
of obligation "must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of 
the world in which he is placed".43 The highest good and the condition of every other good, 
even happiness, is a will that is good in itself.44 
 Regarding well-being he is very explicit in what he means the term contains. He 
writes that well-being or ill-being "always signifies only a reference to our state of 
agreeableness or disagreeableness, of gratification or pain, and if we desire or avoid an object 
on this acount we do so only insofar as it is referred to our sensibility and to the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure it causes."45 As being a reference to the states of our sensibility, of 
agreeableness of disagreeableness, well-being in Kant is understood as empirically contingent 
states and preferences that, in view of his account of the good will, cannot in itself merit any 
moral worth. If well-being is to have any moral relevance at all it would have to be with the 
good will as the condition as it is to be the condition of every other good. 
 Kant does however acknowledge some moral importance to our sensible well-being. 
He writes: 
 
Certainly, our well-being and woe count for a very great deal in the appraisal of our practical reason 
and, as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, all that counts is our happiness if this is 
appraised, as reason especially requires, not in terms of transitory feeling but of the influence this 
contingency has on our whole existence and our satisfaction with it; but happiness is not the only 
thing that counts. The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:389 
44 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:396 
45 Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J Gregor. 1996. Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy. 
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 5:60 
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and to this extent his reason certainly has a commision from the side of his sensibility which it cannot 
refuse, to attend to its interests and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, 
where possible, in a future life as well.46 
 
Here we already get a hint that "our whole existence" cannot merely be rational activity and 
having a good will. Our sensible aspect and so our sensible needs do demand some 
assessment and attention; they just do not merit moral value in themselves. Kant even goes as 
far as claiming that to let reason determine the will is good while let gratification determine 
the will is well-being, implying that well-being and goodness are two completely different 
things.47 Still, if we are to understand the depths of how this can be and what it all will entail 
we must dig deeper into the metaphysics of what morals is, which I will do later in this 
chapter. 
 Kant's use of the term "well-being" here is one that I will call a narrow use of the 
word, well-beingN, as it only contains "wellness" in terms of empirical considerations, 
excluding rational activity both as a possible existence in itself and from any sensible being 
that is also, at the same time, a rational being. However, this narrow view is not the only 
approach in making sense of the term "well-being". 
 On a different account Amartya Sen writes that in evaluating well-being it has to be a 
form of an assessment of the constitutive elements of a person's being.48 If we are to say that 
a person or any living being is well or has a certain degree of "well-ness" it would have to be 
in reference to constitutive elements of what characterizes the life and existence of that 
person or living thing. The better quality of a being's constitutive elements the more "well-
ness" or well-being would that being have. The same would go for any conception of human 
flourishing; if we are to assess the "flourishing" of a human being it would have to be by a 
standard of what "being human" fundamentally is, where having or being more of that means 
flourishing as a human. This would be well-being in the wide sense of the word, well-beingW, 
one that is not seen in Kant's own writing but it is a use of the term that, as I will attempt to 
show in the following chapters, we can benefit from using when reading and assessing Kant's 
moral framework as he is without question attempting to make an account of what it is to be 
human which can be evaluated in term of degree, of "more or less". 
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47 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 5:62 
48 Sen, Inequality Reexamined, p.39 
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 Now, the specific criteria of any evaluation of well-being in the wide sense could vary 
greatly, all dependent on the constitutive standard that makes out the foundation. Even many 
of the elements of well-beingN, such as those of gratification that is criticized by Kant, could 
be judged to be at the center of what characterizes being human and so be central to a 
constitutive standard of human well-beingW. For instance, if we were to make a utilitarian 
approach to well-beingW happiness, or utility, would probably be at the center of what 
constitutes human life and so aiming at maximizing happiness or utility would be to aim at 
greater well-being. On the feminist account the ontological model view humans as relational, 
conceiving agents as mutually interconnected, vulnerable and dependent. On this account 
human well-being, or human flourishing, would probably be grounded in care and caring 
relations as care is the normative core of feminist ethics.49 50 In the Capabilities Approach we 
have seen that relevant functionings that constitute our very being, "can vary from such 
elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable 
morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, 
having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on."51 Leaving these 
accounts behind as only illustrations of how diverse the accounts of well-beingW could be, to 
make the Kantian approach the normative core must be established under the authority of the 
categorical imperative and, moving from the merely metaphysical account of morals to how 
it is to affect and determine our everyday lives, assessed in reference to virtue. 
 To get this project going we need to start working on answering this key question: 
What are the constitutive or defining characteristics of human life? While Sen writes that 
living may be seen as consisting of interrelated functionings, consisting of beings and doings, 
we would definitely benefit from a more comprehensive assessment of what "beings and 
doings" consists of if, why it is normative and what it leads to in how we ought to live our 
lives. I believe that such an assessment can be found in Kant, which is what led me to this 
project in the first place, as Kant also seem to view human life as a form of functioning or 
function that is an activity of being and doing what constitute its existence. A good place to 
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start will be to explore the argument of function in general and then move on to Kant's 
account of organized existence as an end in itself that can be good in-and for itself.  
 
2.2 The general argument of function 
According to philosopher Christine Korsgaard Kant follow Aristotle's metaphysics when 
assessing what constitutes being a thing, or being a living being. To know what a thing or 
being is, it's identity or what kind of object it is, is to know its function, purpose or 
characteristic activity. She writes that the clearest case is that of artefacts, which are clearly 
defined functionally. The idea is that an artifact has both a form and a matter. Matter is the 
material it is made of, such as for instance wood or bronze, and the form is the functional or 
teleological arrangements of the material that gives the artifact its purpose, or function.52 For 
instance, if we organise concrete, lumber, metal and brick in a certain way we can make a 
house, and the function of a house is to serve as a habitable shelter. When the materials are 
successfully organized in a way that together they make a habitable shelter then they have the 
form of a house. Functional arrangement or teleological organization then means the 
arrangement or organization of the parts of an object that enables it to exist as it does, making 
it the kind of thing that it is.  
 Now, the standards that a thing is to be evaluated from is what Korsgaard call 
constitutive standards, meaning that living up to this standard is what makes something the 
kind of thing that it is.53 Thus, if I am to build a house I have to organize matter in such a way 
that it lives up to the standard of a habitable shelter. If the construction has cracks in the wall 
or holes in the roof that does not shelter well then we can assess the construction as being less 
of a good house. A bad house is a house that is buildt in such a way that it poorly lives up to 
the standard of what a house is. A mere heap of materials fail at living up to the standards so 
grossly that is it not even a house at all. This means that the constitutive standards of a thing 
also is the standard for normative judgements, if the thing is good or bad at being what it is 
supposed to be as a thing in itself. Similarly, the function of a knife is to cut, so the 
organization of a material or several materials together that is effective at cutting is good at 
being a knife, or just simply is a good knife. If the artifact is so blunt that it cannot even make 
a scratch then it does not live up to the standard of what knives are and so don't even merit 
the title or description of "being a knife". 
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 This argument of constitutive standards seems simple enough to grasp when it is 
about artifacts, but the most interesting and important aspect of it is when we turn to 
constitutive standards for activities. In an important passage Korsgaard writes that: 
 
An especially important instance of the constitutive standard is what I call the constitutive principle, a 
constitutive standard applying to an activity. In these cases what we say is that if you are not guided 
by the principle, you are not performing that activity at all. In the case of essentially goal-directed 
activities, constitutive principles arise from the constitutive standards of the goals to which they are 
directed. A house-builder is, as such, trying to build an edifice that will keep the rain and weather out. 
But all activities - as opposed to mere sequences or events or processes - are, by their nature, directed, 
self-guided, by those who engage in them, even if they are not directed or guided with reference to 
external goals (...) So it is a constitutive principle of walking that you put one foot in front of the 
other, and a constitutive principle of skipping that you do this with a hop or a bounce.54 
 
What Korsgaard is arguing here is that any goal-oriented activity, such as house building or 
walking, is an activity in itself that we can be good or bad at doing independent of any further 
goal. What is constitutive of walking is putting one foot in front of the other and this is true 
independently of you finding it enjoyable or not. It is also true independent of you wanting or 
needing to walk or if you are not even walking right now. Similarly, I might want to build a 
beautiful house, I might want to give my family shelter, I might get paid to build a house for 
someone else or I might not care about houses at all, but none of these considerations 
contribute to what house-building is or how other individuals can objectively assess my 
performance if I were to build a house. Granted, my feelings or attituted might affect my 
performance and results, but that only affect the normative assessment of my final product 
and performance, if I am good or bad at housebuilding. It does not change what constitutes 
the activity in itself and so does not change the normative standard. The activity of building 
houses is defined by its constitutive principle, and building a bad house is the same activity as 
building a good one, only that is it done badly.55 
 Korsgaard writes that an attractive feature of normative standards through function is 
that it is easy to defend its authority. It does not make any sense to ask "why should I put one 
foot in front of the other if I want to walk?", nor does it make any sense to ask why a house 
should serve as a habitable shelter. Granted, you could ask this in a technical or 	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epistemological way to understand what walking is or what a house is, so you can learn about 
it and engage in it yourself, but its normative authority is indisputable. If you don't put one 
foot in front of the other you are failing at the constitutive standard of walking and you are 
then simply not walking, and if you throw some wooden planks on top of a heap of bricks 
and pour some cement on top of it all then your construction is grossly failing at being what a 
house is supposed to be.56 
 
2.3 Function and normativity of sensible life 
I believe that Korsgaard is right in attributing this view of function also to Kant. The best 
source to identify this similarity is in the second part of the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement, which we now turn to to explore a much more interesting application of the 
function argument; the existence of living beings. This second part of the Critique of The 
Power of Judgement, the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, is a very dense and 
difficult text to read and would merit a paper on its own if I were to make a satisfactory 
account of it's arguments. Since the scope of this paper will exclude such an ambitious 
project I will only aim at extracting the main points that are relevant for the purpose of my 
arguments. 
 Leaving artefacts and artificially constructed things aside and turning to products of 
nature Kant argues for what he calls organized beings that are also, at the same time, natural 
ends, meaning that they functionally exist in-and for themselves without reference to any 
other being or purpose. He writes: 
 
Now for a thing as a natural end it is requisite, first, that its parts (as far as their existence and their 
form are concerned) are possible only through their relation to the whole. For the thing itself is an 
end, and is thus comprehended under a concept or an idea that must determine a priori everything that 
is to be contained in it.57 
 
For us to cognize a thing or a being as a (natural) thing in itself every part of it must be 
(rationally judged a priori) only possible and existing as a part of a unity, as a single being. 
Further: 
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But if a thing, as a natural product, is nevertheless to contain in itself and its internal possibility a 
relation to ends, i.e., is to be possible only as a natural end and without the causality of the concepts of 
a rational being outside of it, then it is required, second, that its parts be combined into a whole by 
being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form. (...) For a body, therefore, which is to be judged 
as a natural end in itself and in accordance with its internal possibility, it is required that its parts 
reciprocally produce each other, as far as both their form and their combination is concerned, and thus 
produce a whole out of their own causality (...).58 
 
An artefact can only be cognized functionally from the perspective and needs of a rational 
being that is "outside of it". For instance I can observe something and think "this thing is 
something I can sit on", cognizing it functionally in reference to myself as a chair. However, 
a thing as a natural product is, independent of any rational spectator, a thing in itself when an 
organ produces its other parts where, consequently, each part produce each other. Kant writes 
that "then and only on that account can such a product, as an organized and self-organizing 
being, be called a natural end."59 In other words, a natural end is something that, in virtue of 
its internal organization, i.e. the reciprocal relationship of its parts as producing and 
maintaining each other, is self-organizing and so is teleologically cognized as something in-
and for itself. Such a being, Kant adds, cannot merely be a machine. For instance, in a watch 
where one part is the instrument for the movement of another it only has a motive power. An 
organized being as a natural end has to have a formative power, meaning that in virtue of its 
form, or organization, the being has a self-propagating power where its parts are the efficient 
cause for the production of other parts. This is something that cannot be explained by a 
motive mechanism alone.60 
 An objection that can emerge from this is that there are apparantly growing parts of a 
being that are mere results or products that does not play any reciprocally role, but Kant 
answers this possible objection early. He writes that there might always be the possibility or 
presence of parts that can only be conceived as concequenses of merely mechanical law, such 
as the growth of skin and hair that does not play any reciprocal role in the organized being. 
Yet, he continues, the cause that provides the appropriate material, modifies it, forms it and 
deposits it in its appropriate place must always be judged teleologically so that everything in 
it must be considered as organized and that everything is also, in a certain relation to the 
thing itself, an organ in turn. 	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 There is something intuitive about this account of understanding living, or existing, 
beings as having an internal organization that makes it a singular entity, or as having an inner 
causality that define what it is. Another way or explaining "inner causality" is to say that a 
living being has its own law, a principle that defines what activity, or causality, that makes it 
what it is. Kant writes that nature "in the most general sense is the existence of things under 
law", meaning that for something to be natural is has be cognized as existing under a law, or 
principle.61 As rational beings Kant thinks that we necessarily understands the world through 
laws, or representation of laws62; this is how we can find consistent patterns to make sense of 
the world and navigate through it by concepts. Now, this definition and use of the term 
"nature" is pretty simple and very familiar, where the most familiar application of this is 
empirically conditioned laws, or what we usually call natural laws; causal relationships of 
the sensible world that explain the mechanics of the natural order. The scientific method is 
based on identifying these laws to understand "the clockwork", as it were, of the world we 
live in. But these natural laws of science are not the only aspects of our world that we cognize 
under laws. We also view things and particularly living things under laws, where to know 
what a thing is, for instance a particular kind of animal, is to know its causality, i.e. the law 
(form) of its organization. This is what Korsgaard was arguing by constitutive standards and 
constitutive principles that I mentioned in section 2.2; for something to be what it is it has to 
live up to the principle that define, or describe, its characteristic activity. The more or less a 
being is living up to it's internal organization of what characterizes its particular kind of life 
the better or worse is it at being what it is. It is in virtue of its law, of it's constitutive 
principle, that we can make normative judgements on it. A being can be good or bad in 
reference to its functional constitution. 
 We however need to explore this claim of organized beings and normative 
judgements further. As was mentioned but not explicitly explained in section 2.2, function as 
constitutive principles are about an internal arrangement or organization that makes 
something what it is. Particularly when assessing living beings as a thing in itself we must 
understand that their "function" or "purpose" is not to be viewed as being in reference to 
human needs or any other externally assigned purpose. For instance, the purpose of an ox is 
not to plow the fields and the function of trees is not to provide wood for making fires or 
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building houses. What we are interested in is revealing the internal, teleological organization 
that makes the object live its particular form of life.63 64 
 Consistent with the Kantian account of self-organized beings Christine Korsgaard 
argues that in animals ones characteristic activity or functional arrangements, its form, is 
what makes as animal maintain and reproduce itself, meaning an internal organization that is 
self-maintaining.65 Function and so life is then just to be - and to continue to be - what that 
living thing is. Conversely, while living is self-maintained activity then dying and death is 
disintegration from this activity, not being able to keep doing it. So for instance the function 
of a giraffe is to be, and to continue to be, a giraffe. A healthy giraffe is then one that is 
internally well organized in keeping its "giraffeness" going, such as nourishing itself, finding 
shelter when needed, avoid predators and being resistent to disease. Actually, health and 
"being healthy" is just a name for the inner condition of what your sensible form is, being 
self-maintaining and thus avoiding disintegration. 
 This account connects health to normativity as the condition of an individual animal's 
internal organization affects how that individual lives up to its constitutive principle as the 
kind of life it has. A healthy giraffe is also a good giraffe because it is good at maintaining its 
form, its "giraffeness". A sick giraffe is subsequenty worse of by the standard of function; it 
is disintegrating from its self-maintaining form and so is less good at being a giraffe because 
it is doing, or being, what constitutes its particular way of living at a lesser degree. Life, in 
other words, is a continued activity of constituting yourself as what you are, meaning that the 
life of a giraffe is a continued activity of living up to what being a giraffe is. And, even 
though the internal activity is dependent on external matter, such as the need to inhale oxygen 
and consume nutrition, the individual is still to be viewed as a singular organized being 
where its parts are reciprocally producing and maintaining each other. This is the same for 
any biological, empirical animal; that includes the human animal. 
 In section 2.2 I wrote that the authority of normative standards is easy to defend and I 
find the same true considering the function of living, self-organized beings. It would seem 	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ludicrous to ask why a giraffe should eat leaves, drink water, mate with other giraffes and 
avoid being eaten by predators as these are all part of its functional arrangements that makes 
it maintain itself; it is necessary in virtue of what constitutes it's very existence. It's particular 
kind of life is to do those things, and the better or worse an individual giraffe is at doing this 
to maintain itself we can judge it as good or bad at living its constitutive kind of life. 
 Further, constitutive standards establishes intrinsic value as the existence of a living 
being is an end in itself, or good for its own sake; its teleological end is to be - and continue 
to be - what it is. The function of a giraffe is simply its internal organization and not any 
external purpose, meaning that a good giraffe is a something - or a someone - that is good for 
its own sake; it is good at being what's constitutive of its very existence. 
 So, regarding the constitutive standard of function, or being a self-organized being, 
the terms goodness, health and, ofcourse, wellness are all appropriate and point toward the 
same aspect of a living being; the quality or degree of being and doing what characterizes 
their particular kind of existence, and the well-beingW of a living thing is to be evaluated by 
an assessment of how well it is living up to its constitutive principle as a self-organizing 
being. 
 Still, even if a living being can be good in itself, for its own sake, where we can asses 
it's well-being in virtue of its form, it does not follow any grounds for obligation with this 
alone. This is because the current assessment of sensible life is only one of biological self-
maintenance, of "blind causality". This necessity is simply a mechanical and instinctive one 
in virtue of internal organization. It cannot provide a conception of "ought" in relation to 
itself as it lacks the self-conscious activity that provide grounds for action that is not just 
immediate instinct.66 Without self-conscious activity, as I will argue more in-depth later, 
there cannot be any "ought" as there is no conflict, only automatic conformity to its own 
causality. This further means that even though we have a normative standard for living beings 
we cannot allocate blame or responsibility in virtue of this. Even instincts that conflict with 
self-maintenance like mistaking a predator for prey or neglecting to find shelter when needed 
does not make an individual animal responsible or blameworthy of its demise in terms of "it 
should have know better" or "it should have done something different" since it really is not 
within its power when lacking self-conscious activity; it is only subjected to sensible 
determination, it's own causality that can be better or worse for its own end. Granted, we 
could say that it failed or only were good up until this point as its normative standard is still 	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in force, but it does not make sense to say that a giraffe ought not to have eaten poisonous 
leaves as if it had a conscious and active, observational relationship to itself and alternatives 
besides the most immediate and strongest impulse. A bad giraffe is not an immoral giraffe. It 
is bad in the same way we would say a knife is bad; it is bad at doing, or being, what it is 
supposed to be. The most beneficial to the animal would certainly be to not eat poisonous 
leaves, but when motivated and organized by instinct alone there is no responsibility, only the 
circumstances of chance following sensible, determined law that can lead to beneficial 
outcomes or not. Thus, the normative standards of organized, sensible life could never serve 
as a moral normative standard as sensible laws in themselves cannot provide a guiding 
principle outside of their own determined mechanism. Conformity to sensible causality 
cannot in any meaningful sense be called "to be guided" as we would merely be "controlled" 
or "determined"; if a preference or inclination had authority in itself then we could never be 
wrong or responsible in anything we did. Thus we cannot establish a moral normativity just 
from sensibility, meaning that on this Kantian account of sensible life we haven't yet found a 
normative standard of well-being that we ought to promote. There has to be something else, 
something more that in it's existence there is possible to question a sensible command, 
becoming aware that there not only are other options but that you can also direct yourself in 
that direct in spite of natural law inclining you to something else. I believe that, as I will 
argue in the next section, this awareness and so responsibility and "ought" arises from the 
function of reason - or rationality - as self-conscious activity. It is with this ability we can be 
free from the dictates of empirical causality and so act otherwise, rendering us responsible for 
our actions and so constitute a standard for good and bad action and agency. It is with this 
ability we can establish a moral normativity of well-being. 
 
2.4 Function and normativity of rational life 
In the previous section I briefly argued that we could not establish obligation within the 
function of sensible life alone as we need a conscious relationship to what and why if there is 
to be responsibility and a conception of "ought" at all. I believe that this is closely related to 
what Kant was thinking about when he wrote that moral philosophy had to be cleansed from 
principles of mere experience and everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to 
anthropology. His claim is that only a law that must carry with it absolute necessity can hold 
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as a ground for obligation, and such a law, he writes, must be found a priori in concepts of 
pure reason and not on empirical grounds.67 
 I believe that when we are reading Kant, as we ought to do when reading any 
philosopher, it is important to be aware of the purpose and ambition of the work we are 
reading and assessing if we are to understand the content. In the introduction to this paper I 
raised some common objections to Kant's moral philosophy that criticized his moral 
framework of being too much focused on "blind duty" and reason while neglecting our 
sensible needs and individual social relationships. These criticisms seems to arise from 
reading the Groundwork and that work alone as the focus is usually on the categorical 
imperative and what they believe Kant's account of duty to the moral law will amount to in 
our everyday lives, even when arguments and points raised in the Metaphysics and Critique 
of Practical Reason cleary rejects them. It is important to notice that in the preface of the 
Groundwork Kant writes: 
 
Intending to publish some day a metaphysics of morals, I issue this groundwork in advance (...) The 
present groundwork is, however, nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme 
principle of morality, which constitutes by itself a business that in its purpose is complete and to be 
kept apart from every other moral investigation.68 
 
Thus the point of the Groundwork is, foremost, the search and establishment of the 
categorical imperative, a project that has to be done in isolation first and not based on 
contingent, subjective empirical grounds. Any other moral investigations, such as social 
relationships and duties related to our capacities of mind, body and spirit, will have to wait. 
This is why sensibility and efficacy is given so little attention in the Groundwork. Not 
because it was regarded as unimportant but because it was not within the intended scope of 
that project. It is critical to understand that in the Groundwork Kant was foremost 
undertaking an assessment of reason viewed in isolation, as something that is an activity in 
itself with its own constitutive principle. Granted, the Groundwork is obviously a 
philosophical work that can be a subject of review and criticism on its own, but the point here 
is that it does not tell the complete story of Kant's moral theory. Ann Margaret Baxley seems 
to have the same idea, writing that Kant makes no attempt to set out a full account of moral 
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character in that work.69 She further writes that the account of the good will is the closest 
approximation we get to an account of character in the Groundwork, but a good will is not 
the same as having a morally good character. The good will that render us autonomous 
represents the core, distinguishing feature of a morally good person, but virtue in terms of 
autocracy is something over and above the good will. I will return to autocracy and virtue in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 Without isolating reason in an assessment of its own I don't think we can do a just 
reading of Kant because I believe that this was exactly what he was doing himself, and by 
failing to do this we will inevitably end up with, in my opinion, an insufficient reading that 
wrongly results in judging it as an impossible and impractical moral theory. Firstly we can 
look at reason as something in itself to better understand it and then we can look at reason in 
interaction with our sensible being to better understand what it all means and amounts to in 
everyday life. I think it is a plausible worry that much of the criticisms of Kant are because of 
a neglect of this essential, preliminary consideration. 
 But what really is reason? Christine Korsgaard suggests that reason is a power in 
virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness where we are conscious of the grounds of our 
own beliefs and actions70, meaning we can observe ourselves and have grounds that are not 
simply instincts or impulses. In other words, as human beings we are not only sensible beings 
with feelings, inclinations and preferences but we also observe these impulses and make 
judgements on them. This form of self-conscious activity, she writes, gives us a capacity to 
control and direct our beliefs and actions, meaning we are active in a way that differs from 
merely sensible causality. Granted, self-conscious activity is obviously linked to sensible life 
as it is sensible inputs and impulses that we necessarily observe, but what we observe does 
not constitute or define the activity of observation itself. In this regard Kant is not really 
making some unreal or impractical claims when he writes that proper moral philosophy needs 
to be cleansed from principles of experience and everything that is only empirical or from 
anthropology. What he is interested in is to assess our capacity to act free from sensible 
determined laws. This capacity, as an activity in itself, has its own law and so constitutive 
principle which is not determined by sensible, or empirical, existence. 
 Korsgaard further writes that this power of self-conscious activity does not only make 
us active in a way that differ from just being a sensible form of life. It also gives us the 	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problem, or challenge, of having to decide what counts as a ground or reason for beliefs and 
actions. Reason, Korsgaards writes, is then the capacity for normative self-government. This 
in turn means that there is an inexorable truth about the human condition that our self-
consciousness condemns us to choice and action.71 No matter what we feel, think or want as a 
sensible being we have a conscious relationship to ourselves, making us aware of our 
sensibility and making us assess these experiences in our every waking hour. This aspect of 
our existence is then unconditional, and the name that Kant uses to describe this unavoidable 
psychological force that operates in us is necessitation. The activity of reason is necessitated, 
meaning we are inevitably engaged in it. 
 When reading Kant I make the same interpretation as Korsgaard, thinking that Kant 
had the same view of reason being necessitated self-conscious activity. Kant writes that a 
good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes but because of its volition, 
that is, it is good in itself. Usefullness or fruitlessness cannot add or take away anything to the 
worth of the will72, and the true vocation of the will, he write, "must be to produce a will that 
is good, not perhaps as a means to other purposes, but good in itself, for which reason was 
absolutely necessary".73 I find this quote very interesting. If the true purpose of the will is to 
produce a good will then this sounds very similar to the Aristotelian argument of function 
that I reviewed earlier through the work of Korsgaard and Kant's own account of self-
organized beings, meaning that the will has its own internal organization that makes it what it 
is and so a good will is a will that is good at willing, i.e. good at being what it is. In other 
words, Kant claims that willing is an activity in itself and not primarily a means to other 
purposes. I find this idea supported further by this passage that says: 
 
Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in 
accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from 
law, the will is nothing other than practical reason.74 
 
If I have understood this passage correctly I take it to mean that only a rational being can 
become aware of-and adopt laws, or purposes, that are not merely instinctive. I made this 
argument earlier, that as rational beings we necessarily cognize the sensible world through 
laws. If this is true then Kant seems to share the idea that "reason is a power we have in 	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virtue of a certain type of self-consciousness".75 It also supports my earlier claim that within 
the function of sensible life alone, without reason, there cannot be any "oughts" or obligation 
as there is no conception of principles or laws at all, only "blind" mechanical instinct. The 
power of reason means that we are not simply subjected to the random circumstances of the 
world but that we can review them, assess them and make a decision on them according to 
principles that are not simply instinct or subjective preferences and inclinations. We have the 
ability to decide, or will, what we are to do and why we are to do it independent of our initial 
instinctive responce and independent on other preferences and inclinations that we might 
have. This makes it much clearer how the good will is not only the highest good but that it 
also must be the condition of any other good; of all the laws we can cognize the condition for 
these laws is reason itself, i.e. their authority is contingent on the constitutive principle of 
reason itself. Any law, to qualify as a law at all, must be by the activity of willing where the 
will is good in-and for itself, not by reference to anything empirical. 
 In other words, to have a will is then to be able to take a step back from sensibility 
and to assess ourselves, our surroundings and our situation on grounds, or laws, independent 
of initial sensible reactions. Looking back at the argument of function, for a will to be good it 
has to be good at what willing is, which is, according to the quoted passage by Kant, nothing 
other than practical reason. To will something and to have a good will is essentially the same 
thing, which is to be good at the activity of reason. I suspect that many problems and 
missreadings of Kant occur if we are to mix reason and sensibility into one singular function, 
thinking that "willing" is to simply use reason instrumentally as a tool or means to identify 
and promote our sensible preferences or needs, which I think was Kant's concern when he 
wrote: 
 
(...) in a being that has reason and a will, if the proper end of nature were its preservation, its welfare, 
in a word its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the 
reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions that the creature has to perform for 
this purpose, and the whole rule of its conduct, would be marked out for it far more accurately by 
instinct, and that end would have thereby been attained much more surely than it ever can be by 
reason.76 
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I take this passage to strongly imply that Kant did think that rational activity and sensible life 
is, even though they can exist at the same time in an individual being, two different activities 
with their own normative standards. This position is strengthened when we also read that the 
human being and in general every rational being - implying that "being a rational being" is 
something in itself, or atleast not bound to any specific form of empirical life - exists as an 
end in itself77, that "will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational"78, 
and that he further argues that the ground for an objective and a supreme practical principle is 
that rational nature exists as an end in itself79, meaning that rational nature is something 
existing in-and for itself, as a causality in itself, independent of any sensible nature. 
 For Kant rational activity is then essentially a form of life or existence in its own 
right, and just as the activity of (self-organized) sensible life is subjected to a normative 
standard of good and bad, so is rational activity. Rational activity then also has intrinsic value 
because - to paraphrase the conclusion from last section to fit with this one - the existence of 
a being is an end in itself, or good for its own sake; its teleological end is to be - and continue 
to be - what it is. The function of reason, or willing, is it's internal, teleological organization 
and not any external purpose, meaning that a good will is good for its own sake; it is good at 
being what's constitutive of its very existence. 
 Also in this category I find it appropriate to use the terms health and wellness in 
addition to goodness. Rational activity has its own function that can be performed well or 
badly, its "health" is when its internal organization is well maintained and so its "wellness" or 
well-being is to be evaluated by an assessment of how well a rational being is living up to its 
constitutive principle in virtue of being rational. Reason, or "being rational", is then an 
activity of existence just like "being a giraffe" or "being a knife"; it exists functionally as 
something in itself, not in reference to something else that it can be a means for. 
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3. Being human 
 
3.1 Kant's human being 
Regarding sensible and rational activities a new question emerges; when sensible existence 
and rational existence is both regarded functionally as something in-and for themselves, what 
does that mean for a being, such as the human being, that is characterized by having both 
aspects? If we are to meet the first criteria from the introduction, to make a Kantian account 
of well-beingW, we must undertake this question. 
 Philosopher Robert Louden writes that Kant asserts that the question "what is the 
human being" is the most fundamental question in philosophy, but finding the answer is not 
an easy task.80 Even Kant himself offers no complete answer as he does not seem to think 
that it is possible to do so.81 One reason for him to make this claim is that if we are to single 
out what is unique about our own species we would need other species of rational beings, 
other non-human rational beings that are also sensible beings, to single out what is definitive 
about us in comparison.82 However, we can still make some sense of what characterizes the 
human condition. 
 According to Louden Kant firstly holds that human beings, like any other living 
creatures and unlike machines, must be studied teleologically in terms of their natural 
purposes.83 I have already reviewed this account in section 2.3 on self-organized beings and, 
in section 2.4, on the function and self-organized existence of reason. Second, Louden writes 
that for Kant the human being is an animal endowed with the capacity of reason, i.e. that as 
sensible beings we also have the ability to become rational if we exercise this capacity, 
meaning that we are not necessarily and automatically rational; we can fail or be bad at doing 
it.84 Third, in accordance with this fallible ability of being rational, Kant's theory of virtue is 
in effect a theory of morality designed to fit the specific conditions of human beings85; only 
by having knowledge about the human sensible nature can we make sense of how and to 
what extent we can be moral by determining our will in accordance with reason. 
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 While there is no doubt that reason is essential for Kant regarding morality and the 
human activity our sensibility is also important for him regarding what we fundamentally are 
and to what extent we can exercise our moral capacity. Louden writes that in his lectures on 
ethics Kant describes the metaphysical account of morality as "the first part of morals", 
which is the non-empirical and pure part of morals build on necessary laws. This means that 
the metaphysical account of morality cannot be grounded in the particular (sensible) 
constitution of a rational being (such as the human being) but must rather be grounded in 
"being a rational being as such", or in other words, the function of rational existence. The 
second part however is what Kant call moral anthropology or practical anthropology, which 
is the empirical part of ethics. It is morality applied to the human being in particular and this 
is where the empirical principles belong.86 The (moral) task of Kant's anthropology is to 
identify what it is about our particular biological species of rational beings that makes it hard 
or easy for us to act morally, of what specific sensible passions and inclinations we are 
subjected to that tends to make it relatively difficult or easier to adhere to moral principles.87 
Thus, the overarching goal of moral anthropology is to figure out what human nature is like 
in order to more effectively further moral ends. If we know about the empirical human nature 
then we would be better equipped to make morality more efficacious in human life by 
identifying obstacles and how we are to go past them, letting reason determine our will. This 
goal is clearly a moral one, Louden writes, as this pursuit to understand human nature in 
order to further moral ends are deeply value-embedded, or morally guided.88 
 Kant did, contrary to popular belief, show concern about the important role sensibility 
play in moral agency. In the Moralphilosophie Collins transcription he stated that "people are 
always preaching about what ought to be done, and nobody thinks about whether it can be 
done"89, implying that to make morality practical and applicable in the sensible world we 
must care for and cultivate our sensible states and powers to make moral life possible. This is 
where virtue, which I will return to in chapters 4 and 5, becomes essential to Kant's doctrine 
of moral agency. In the Groundwork he emphasizes that morals needs anthropology for its 
application to human beings as human beings cannot simply "jump into" pure ethics unaided. 
We need knowledge about our own empirical situation as a necessary prerequisite.90 The 
purpose of the knowledge moral anthropology is to offer ethics is practical efficacy, making 	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us able to succeed as moral agents. Obviously, considerations of the moral rule are useless if 
we cannot prepare people to fulfill it.91 
 
3.2 The peculiar condition of being a rational animal 
As I argued in chapter 2, both sensible life and rational life is functionally good in-and for 
themselves and they are two distinct activities where both are featured in human beings. Yet, 
when reading Kant he gives rational existence a higher value and importance. He even begins 
the first section of the Groundwork by writing that "it is impossible to think of anything at all 
in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation 
except a good will".92 A few pages later he writes that a will that is good in itself has a worth 
that "surpasses all else"93 and that it not only is the highest good but also the condition of 
every other good.94 How can these two principles that is initially good in themselves be of 
different value and hierarchical rank? 
 My suggestion is that the answer is already implisit in the first sentence. Rational 
activity is self-conscious activity, or in other words the very faculty of reflective thinking. It 
is constitutive of the very possibility of a capacity to act in accordance with the representation 
of laws and so is the necessary and constitutive element of a will where we can act free from 
mere sensible causality. Even the goodness of a sensible self-organized being only makes 
sense when observed by rational activity, an observation that cognizes the world in 
accordance with laws and so a conception of ends. This is why we cannot think of anything 
else but a good will as unlimited good; it is the very condition of cognizing and to act in 
accordance with goodness. Thus, when it comes to being moral, to act good, reason hold the 
normative standard as this is the standard of acting freely from mere sensible causality. Kant 
compares the good will with talents of mind such as understanding and wit, qualities of 
temperament such as courage and resolution and gifts of fortune such as power, honor and 
riches, saying they are all good and desirable for many purposes but that they can also be 
extremely harmful and evil if the will is not good. For anything to be morally good it has to 
be within the framework of rational activity, meaning that any action must ultimately be for 
the sake of reason (as its goodness is being good in-and for itself), following its constitutive 
principle that is also known as the moral law. In other words, only a good will is good 	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without limitation and is the necessary condition of any other good because it is constitutive 
of any reflective relationship to goodness. Anything else can only be good by limitation, and 
this limitation is the framework allowed by the functionally cognized nature of the will. 
 Yet, even if the good will is (the only) good without limitation and is the aspect that 
constitute moral goodness we still have a sensible aspect to consider that can be functionally 
good or bad viewed in itself. Kant did after all write that the human being view her self by 
the two attributes of sensible and intelligible being.95 I think that the necessitated ability of 
self-conscious activity somewhat complicates the human condition by giving us a peculiar 
characteristic. I find it useful to think that there are really two instances of necessitation. First 
it is rational activity as self-conscious activity in itself that is necessitated, and secondly we 
necessarily observe our own sensible constitution with this rational activity. We are 
constantly being confronted with different whats and whys that we must assess as we cannot 
avoid observing our sensible aspect any more than we can avoid the capacity of self-
conscious activity itself, making the two aspects - which have their own respective normative 
standards - intertwined. We could say that as human beings our intelligibility and sensibility 
have an intertwined necessity that is made possible by, and is to be determined by, reason. 
Granted, we might drift into our own thoughts and for a minute not noticing that we are 
hungry or that our chin is resting on a closed fist, but for most of our waken lives we are 
confronted with sensible needs, inclinations and impulses whether we want to or not. Our 
sensibility is maybe subjected to our rationality but we cannot simply "will away" also being 
a sensible animal any more than we can will away having a will. I think that it is this 
"intertwined-ness" that makes human moral life both difficult to grasp and challenging to 
realize. 
 We can make sense of the problem like this: As a self-conscious being we are 
necessarily commited to the principle of rationality, and as a being that can act according to 
the representation of laws we are also confronted with the principle of our - also inescapable 
in virtue of our self-consciousness - sensible aspect. Both attributes have their own normative 
standard and as both rational and sensible beings we can assess and act in accordance with 
this knowledge. For instance, whenever I feel hunger I also become conscious of a sensible 
need or inclination. But I don't only only feel hunger, I am also aware that being nourished 
with food and water is good for me as an animal; it contributes to me being-and-continuing-
to-be what my particular kind of sensible existence is. I now have an inclination and I have 	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knowledge of this inclination being good for maintaining my animal aspect. The question 
now is "what ought I to do?" By the normative standard of my particular kind of animal form 
it would be good to just eat or drink something nourishing, but what would be rationally, and 
thus morally, good? The end of rational activity is to be good in-and for itself, so how are we 
to will in this scenario to make a moral choice? 
 One possible argument to make is that as far as we know our rational nature is 
dependent on our sensible nature. If consciousness is a product of our brain then our rational 
nature will probably perish when our sensible nature dies. In that case, if our will is to be 
good for its own sake, to maintain itself, then it is of instrumental value to respect and 
promote our animal health. Thus, it is morally good to eat when you are hungry if nourishing 
yourself is the act you do with reason being its ultimate end. Respecting and promoting our 
sensible aspect could then be considered a moral good in virtue of the lifespan of our rational 
existence is dependent on it. 
 A second possible argument can be that as our sensibility constantly tries to influence 
us to do different acts for different ends and as the authority of determination belongs to 
rational activity we must control or master our sensibility so that it does not, as it were, usurp 
the authority that belongs to the will. The desperation of hunger can create a so strong 
impulse that it determines our actions, thus usurping the authority that belongs to reason. 
Kant do write in the Groundwork that there is an indirect duty to assure one's own happiness 
to avoid temptations that could transgress on duty.96 In this case it is morally good to 
maintain a healthy animal condition as it keep any serious challenges to the authority of 
reason at bay. 
 Both arguments however are only scratching the tip of the iceberg and do not really, 
in my opinion, reveal anything fundamental about the metaphysical conditions of moral life. 
To reach a more satisfying answer that meets the core of the relationship between reason and 
sensibility I believe we have to look closer at the relation between those two on the one hand 
and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives on the other. 
 
3.3 The imperatives 
As I established in section 2.4 reason, which makes us able to cognize the world through the 
representation of laws, or principles, has a constitutive principle of it's own which is 
necessitated and so is objectively necessary. Kant makes the argument that: 	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The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a 
command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative. 
 All imperatives are expressed with an ought and indicate by this the relation of an objective 
law of reason to a will that by its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (a 
necessitation).97 
 
Further: 
 
Now, all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represents the 
practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieve something else that one wills (or that it 
is atleast possible for one to will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an 
action that as objectively necessary of itself, without reference to another end (...) Now, if the action 
would be good merely as a means to something else the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is 
represented as in itself good, hence as necessary in a will in itself conforming to reason, as its 
principle, then it is categorical.98 
 
The objective principle of reason, of self-conscious activity, which is good in-and for itself 
and is objectively necessary in virtue of its meataphysical existence, is then the categorical 
imperative. 
 To be as clear as I can be on this rather complicated and often confusing topic, I 
understand that this constitutive principle of reason, or rationality, is best described as 
lawfulness; the constitutive principle of reason is to conceive the world and everything in it as 
constituted by laws in accordance with ends, meaning that the function of the will, its form, is 
lawfulness. Thus, for any action to have moral value, to be rational and so be expressed as 
having a will, it has to have the form of a universal law. In the Critique of Practical Reason 
Kant writes that: 
 
(...) the formal practical principle of pure reason (in accordance with which the mere form of a 
possible giving of universal law through our maxims must constitute the supreme and immediate 
determining ground of the will) is the sole principle that can possibly be fit for categorical 
imperatives, that is, practical laws (which make actions duties), and in general for the principle of 
morality, whether in appraisals or in application to the human will in determining it.99 	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In fewer and simpler words; since we are necessitated to reason the very principle of rational 
activity - which is good in and for itself - is the only principle that can determine our will if 
we are to act free from our sensible causality and so is constitutive of morality, of what we 
ought to do. However, as we cognize the world through representation of laws only the form 
of law itself can be objective and universal, not any subjective sensible or empirical 
considerations that we are legislating about. Kant further writes that autonomy of the will, as 
the sole principle of morality, consists in independence from all matter of the law (namely, 
from a desired object, for instance our happiness) and at the same time is determined through 
the mere form of giving universal law. This means that for a will to give itself it's law through 
the form of lawfulness, not on the (false) authority of sensible preference, is for a will to be 
autonomous and so moral. If desired objects (i.e. the matter of your maxim) enters as a 
condition of the determination of the will then the will is not autonomous but rather 
heteronomous, meaning the will is failing at being what characterizes its very nature and thus 
undermines itself.100 
 In addition to the categorical imperative Kant argues, in the same quote above, that if 
you are to pursue an end you must also be able to will its means. It is a practical necessity 
that if you want to achieve A, and doing B is necessary to do that, then you have to also be 
able to will doing B. This practical necessity is the hypothetical imperative. The categorical 
imperative makes us autonomous, meaning that we are making ourselves a cause in the world 
not determined by sensible causality, while the hypothetical imperative is the enactment of 
this autonomy making us efficacious, meaning it actualizes or succeeds in making ourselves 
a cause in the sensible world.101 As I mentioned earlier in section 3.1, considerations of the 
moral rule are useless if we cannot prepare people to fulfill it. Kant did not overlook this. 
 However, in theory there could be no imperatives at all. Kant writes that a perfectly 
good will would not be represented as necessitated to actions and so that no imperatives holds 
for what he calls a divine will and in general for what he calls a holy will. Any "ought" would 
be out of place here because volition is of itself necessarily in accordance with the law. This 
is because - and this is important - imperatives are "only formulae expressing the relation of 
objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that 
rational being, for example, the human will".102 What he is arguing here is that, atleast in 	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theory, reason could exist in itself without being connected to sensibility. Pure reason, 
without having a body or any sensory inputs, would not have any imperatives or any 
conception of "ought" as it would be perfectly good in itself, not being "clouded" or 
"disturbed" by subjective, sensible influence that would make it an "imperfect will".103 
Conversely, a sensible being that is not rational would also not have any imperatives or 
conception of "ought" as it hasn't the capacity to understand the world through representation 
of laws. After all, imperatives and "ought" only makes sense when there is a conflict; if not it 
would simply be perfect conformity and so no possibility of transgression. Much later in the 
Groundwork Kant gives my interpretation further support when he is making a case for 
reason and sensibility firstly as being seperate, then of them being intertwined and existing 
simultaneously, writing that: 
 
All of my actions as only a member of the world of understanding would therefor conform perfectly 
with the principle of autonomy of the pure will; as only a part of the world of sense they would have 
to be taken to conform wholly to the natural law of desire and inclinations, hence heteronomy of 
nature (...) But because the world of understanding contains the ground of the world of sense and so 
too of its laws, and is therefore immediately lawgiving with respect to my will (which belongs wholly 
to the world of understanding) and must accordingly also be thought as such, it follows that I shall 
cognize myself as intelligence, though on the other side as a being belonging to the world of sense, as 
nevertheless subject to the law of the world of understanding, that is, reason, which contains in the 
idea of freedom of the law of the world of understanding, and thus cognize myself as subject to the 
autonomy of the will (...)104 
 
A being that is only a member of an intelligible world would always have its actions in 
conformity with the autonomy of the will, i.e. the function of reason, and so there would be 
no such thing as "ought". It would simply just "do" or "be". Without sensibility there is no 
world to act in and so no means or ends to deliberate about, but when a rational being also 
have sensibility it is - by observing it's own sensibility by being self-aware - introduced with 
the categorical and hypothetical imperatives that it ought to conform to. It ought to do this 
because the activity of reason is inescapable yet conformity to the principles are not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Kant has been criticized for writing that we would have been better of without sensibility because 
it tries to "usurp" the rule of reason and that it is "distraction of morality", but his point is reasonable 
when we look at the well-being and function of reason in isolation. It is not an argument ment to 
encourage denial or repression of our sensibility but rather to identify the function and nature of 
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automatic, meaning that the rational animal has to make an effort to live up to them when 
sensible inclinations make their demands. 
 Firstly these considerations show that, viewed in isolation, the categorical imperative 
is made possible and necessary by reason as necessitated self-conscious activity while the 
hypothetical imperative is made possible and necessary by sensibility. However, it is only 
when both aspects are present in a single being are these imperatives introduced. This means 
that I was not quite accurate earlier when I wrote that the categorical imperative is the 
constitutive principle of reason; only rational animals that have an imperfect will is subjected 
to imperatives. 
 Second, and most importantly, these considerations show that these two imperatives 
and the two aspects that make them possible are necessarily intertwined and interdependent. 
As Christine Korsgaard writes, the hypothetical imperative is not really a seperate principle at 
all but rather captures the aspect of the categorical imperative that our laws must be practical 
laws105, i.e. in reference to the sensible world that reason is observing and assessing. So, 
while the ground for obligation is not to be found in the sensible nature of the human being 
or in the circumstances of the world in which we are placed the empirical world is the very 
reason we have imperatives at all and is what makes up the matter of our self-legislated 
maxims. Reason and sensibility, when existing together, are actually neither opposing nor 
competing. They just play different roles in virtue of their metaphysical properties as self-
organized existences. 
 
3.4 The constitutive characteristics of the human being 
Following the arguments of chapter 2 and so far in chapter 3 we can now turn to the first 
criteria I raised in the introduction; making a Kantian account of what constitutes human 
well-beingW. My claim that follows from the arguments so far is that the complete Kantian 
picture of the human function, of what it is to be a human being, is the asymmetrical and 
intertwined relationship of reason and sensibility. It is intertwined because, as I argued 
above, both aspects together necessitates the categorical and hypothetical imperatives that, 
when we conform to them, render us both autonomous and efficacious. An important result 
of this is that, as the hypothetical imperative is derived as a necessity of the categorical 
imperative to reflect that our laws must be practical laws, it means that failing to be 
efficacious is also failing at being autonomous. It is failing to become a cause in the world. 	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Much of the litterature on Kant has focused on autonomy and reason but we must not forget 
that the efficacy of our sensible being is also a fundamental part of our moral agency. If we 
are to succeed in being autonomous we also has to be successful in being efficacious, and to 
be efficacious and not just a reaction that is being subjected to the random circumstances of 
the world we have to act autonomously, i.e. being guided by the lawfullness of the will. Thus, 
the two aspects are interdependent where the realization and success of one is dependent on 
the other. The moral debate here is not a question of "should we follow reason or should we 
follow feelings and needs?" as if there would be either-or. These two aspects are not 
competing nor seperate but intertwined and so inseperable, both capturing different aspects of 
a singular kind of life. Still, this relationship is necessarily asymmetrical in terms of reason, 
the faculty of willing and so of autonomy, is the only aspect that merit authority to determine 
the will. Any considerations about our sensible being can only be good by limitation, and this 
limitation is the framework allowed by the nature of the will, of conforming to the form of 
law. Only by being consistent in this activity to cognize the world through the representation 
of laws can we act as a "myself" as a cause in the world instead of simply being a reaction 
within the causality of sensible constitution. Yet, while it might be correct to say that reason 
is to rule and that sensibility is to be ruled we must not be fooled or distracted by the 
implication that the two aspects are seperate or opposing. Their relationship is better 
characterized as a necessitated interdependency, together cumulating into one singel kind of 
life or existence which is the human being, and the constitutive principle of the activity of 
"being human" is then the categorical imperative.106 So even though we have both a sensible 
and a rational aspect the core of our humanity for Kant is our reason. Fundamentally we are 
practical, self-legislative beings that exist as an end in ourselves. 
 There is more support for my argument in Kant's work. In the Critique of Practical 
Reason Kant writes that the moral law provides a fact that is inexplicable from any sensible 
data. It is a fact that points to a pure world of the understanding and even determines it 
positively, letting us cognize it namely as a law.107 Further, in the Groundwork he writes that 
as rational beings we have a capacity to act in accordance with representation of laws108, 
meaning that we understand and cognize the world around us in accordance with ends and 	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speak of both as principles but having to remember that there still is only one constitutive principle. 
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navigate our actions in accordance with laws that are on grounds independent of sensibility. 
Kant made a name to describe this "world of understanding" that furnishes the sensible world 
for us. He calls it supersensible nature: 
 
"Now, nature in the most general sense is the existence of things under laws. The sensible nature of 
rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws and is thus, for reason, 
heteronomy. The supersensible nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence in 
accordance with laws that are independent of any empirical condition and thus belong to the 
autonomy of pure reason. And since the laws by which the existence of things depends on cognition 
are practical, supersensible nature, so far as we can make for ourselves a concept of it, is nothing 
other than a nature under the autonomy of pure practical reason. The law of this autonomy, however, 
is the moral law, which is therefore the fundamental law of a supersensible nature and of a pure world 
of the understanding, the counterpart of which is to exist in the sensible world but without infringing 
upon its laws."109 
 
So, even though morality is to be pure in the sense of not being based on, or determined by, 
sensible and empirical considerations the moral law is still to exist in the sensible world 
where we are, in addition to be rational beings, also sensible beings that exist under 
empirically conditioned laws. As a being that is both bound by empirical laws (as a sensible 
animal) and rational laws (as a self-conscious being that observes our sensible nature and our 
own understanding) we are then a supersensible being where the moral law constitute the 
very principle of what we are as human beings: We project morality into the sensible world 
by our understanding of it through representation of laws, cognizing ourselves as end in 
ourselves as rational beings that are acting in the empirical world while being determined by 
reason. In other words, on Kant's account we are fundamentally characterized as having an 
intertwined and asymmetrical relationship between sensibility and reason. We are constituted 
by the autonomy of the categorical imperative but, as I argued earlier, an aspect of it is the 
hypothetical imperative; failing to be efficatious, i.e. failing at the hypothetical imperative, is 
failing at being autonomous in the empirical world that we are acting in. What it means to be 
a human being is that we are necessitated to the autonomy of the will and that, when we are 
willing in the empirical world, our efficacy to succeed in the means to promote our end is an 
intrinsic part of being an autonomous supersensible being. 
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3.5 Supersensible nature and well-being 
I find it easier to assess Kant's moral philosophy when including the concept of supersensible 
nature as we now can refer to sensible nature isolated, rational nature isolated and, when we 
are discussing the human nature, we can refer to supersensible nature which is both sensible 
and rational aspects together as existing asymmetrically intertwined. 
 An obvious move from this is to note that Kant's use of the term well-being, what I 
call well-being in the narrow sense, refer only to sensibility where a standard of well-being in 
the wide sense will naturally belong to the supersensible existence. Speaking of well-beingN 
and the supersensible nature it can be useful to look back at what Kant has written about our 
well-being: 
  
Certainly, our well-being and woe count for a very great deal in the appraisal of our practical reason 
and, as far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, all that counts is our happiness if this is 
appraised, as reason especially requires, not in terms of transitory feeling but of the influence this 
contingency has on our whole existence and our satisfaction with it; but happiness is not the only 
thing that counts. The human being is a being with needs, insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, 
and to this extent his reason certainly has a commision from the side of his sensibility which it cannot 
refuse, to attend to its interests and to form practical maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, 
where possible, in a future life as well.110 
 
Our (sensible) well-being do merit attention from our reason, demanding assessment not just 
based on the standard of it's own internal organization alone but as a part of our whole 
existence, being an intrinsic part of us as a supersensible being. My argument earlier about 
the hypothetical imperative and that failing to be efficacious is failing to be autonomous 
illustrates the importance of this point further. But we have to be careful when arguing for the 
importance of our sensible well-being, not forgetting the asymmetrical relationship to reason 
where reason is to have the authority to determine the will. The human being, Kant writes: 
 
(...) is nevertheless not so completely an animal as to be indifferent to all that reason says on its own 
and use reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction of his needs as a sensible being. For, that he has 
reason does not at all raise him in worth above mere animality if reason is to serve him only for the 
sake of what instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only a particular mode 
nature had used to equip the human being for the same end to which it has destined animals, without 
destining him to a higher end. No doubt once this arrangement of nature has been made for him he 	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needs reason in order to take into consideration at all times his well-being and woe; but besides this he 
has it for a higher purpose: namely, not only to reflect upon what is good and evil in itself as well - 
about which only pure reason, not sensibly interested at all, can judge - but also to distinguish the 
latter appraisal altogether from the former and to make it the supreme condition of the former.111 
 
Kant is very explicit here on two points. Firstly we are both sensible animals with needs and 
a rational being that can reflect on these needs, meaning both aspects are intertwined in what 
constitutes us as human beings and that these aspects are asymmetrical in relation to each 
other as reason is to be the supreme condition for acting on any considerations of the sensible 
aspect. Secondly, simply having the capacity of reason is not enough to have a dignity as 
rational beings. As Robert Louden notes, to simply use reason instrumentally as a means to 
strategize about how to promote sensible needs is different from using reason in a substantial 
way where we deliber and determine our ends independent from sensible demands.112 The 
Kantian argument is that reason is an existence and activity in itself that we can be good or 
bad at in virtue of it's own constitutive standard, not in reference to sensible needs reducing it 
merely to an instrument of sensible causality. 
 Now, Kant curiously writes that an action having well-being as its end is 
"nevertheless called good (because rational reflection is required for it), not, however, good 
absolutely but only with reference to our sensibility, with respect to its feeling of pleasure 
and displeasure; but the will whose maxim is affected by it is not a pure will, which is 
directed only to that which pure reason can of itself be practical".113 The goal would then be, 
as I am reading this, to aim at what is good with reference to our sensible nature within the 
scope, or limits, of the form of maxims that are absolutely good. Thus, our maxims can aim at 
our happiness and well-beingN provided that the maxim has the form of a universal law. It 
must always be the form of the maxim, never the matter, that is to determine our will. Then, 
and only then, is the pursuit of sensible needs and preferences moral. Then, and only then, are 
we good as a supersensible being. 
 I now find it easy and rather obvious that this account of what it means to be and live 
as human beings can be placed it within the conceptual context of well-beingW. In sections 
2.3 and 2.4 I argued that the activity of sensible self-maintenance is a form of life in its own 
right and that rational activity is a form of life or existence in its own right, both being good 
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in-and for itself in virtue of its internal, teleological organization (its form) that have their 
respective constitutive principles. Further, as I was stressing earlier the rational and sensible 
aspects of the human being are not really seperate but asymmetrically intertwined, making 
out a kind of life in its own right where reason makes us autonomous and sensibility makes 
us efficacious, both capturing a different aspect that together make out a particular kind of 
life; the supersensible existence. The goodness of a human being is then to be measured by 
the extent one lives up to its constitutive principle, i.e. the categorical imperative, not the two 
aspects viewed seperately. A good will and a good efficacy both, i.e. promoting autonomy 
and promoting efficacy under the rule of the will, makes a good human being as the person 
concerned is being good at living up to its constitutive principle. 
 Remembering the point of departure for Amartya Sen the claim is that functionings, 
which is multiple ways of "being and doing", are constitutive of a person's being and so well-
being has to take the form of an assessment of these constitutive elements, making out the 
standard of well-being.114 In this chapter I have argued that the constitutive elements of a 
human being on the Kantian account is the activity constituted by the categorical imperative. 
This principle explains and guides what we are and do as a particular kind of life. Thus, our 
"wellness" or well-beingW is to be evaluated by an assessment of the quality, or of how well, 
a person is living up to this principle, i.e. rendering oneself autonomous and efficacious. I 
hope that I have made is sufficiently clear that the categorical imperative, even though it is a 
law of pure reason, is not simply "a rule devoid of any empirical considerations". As a 
supersensible being our maxims must both have the form of a universal law and we must be 
able to succeed with our maxims if we are to be considered autonomous agents acting in the 
empirical world. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 are central to this argument. Thus, goodness and 
wellness is - as I argued in chapter 2 on sensible and rational existance seperately - 
appropriate terms to describe the state or condition of this internal, teleological organization 
that constitutes this kind of life. A human being is then "better" and "more well off" the more 
autonomous and efficacious that person is115, living up to its principle as a supersensible 
nature. 
 There is still more we can say to make further sense of this account. To reach a more 
complete account we must understand how the state of health in the moral life, according to 	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Kant, is the tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into 
practice.116 If we want to more firmly establish this account of Kantian well-being constituted 
by the supersensible nature, of how we rationally are to relate to our sensible aspect, we 
better take a closer look at the most explorative account of how our sensible and rational 
aspects are related to each other. This account can be found in Kant's doctrine of virtue, of 
how we as supersensible being are determined to live our lives in terms of autocracy. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:409 
	  48	  
 
4. Capabilities, efficacy and the nature of virtue 
 
4.1 Capabilities and the hypothetical imperative 
In chapters 2 and 3 I made my arguments to meet the first criteria raised in the introduction. 
The Kantian account of well-beingW is made by viewing the human being as a supersensible 
nature constituted by the categorical imperative. In this chapter, in addition to strenghten my 
arguments of the first criteria, I will argue for the second criteria: I will make the Kantian 
account of having capabilities, or efficacy, that not only reflects an increase in real 
opportunities in our own agency to further pursue well-beingW but that it is also a constitutive 
part of our well-beingW. 
 Now, regarding functionings and well-being Amartya Sen writes that a closely related 
concept is our capability to function. Capabilities represents various combinations of 
functionings that a person can achieve and thus reflects a person's freedom, or real 
possibilities, to lead one type of life or another, meaning that increased capability is an 
increased scope of being able to both choose and realize how to live your life, to be who you 
want to be an to do what you want to do. The concept of Capabilities is introduced and made 
relevant by the facts that - if well-being is considered important - we firstly need to have the 
means - and so freedom in terms of real opportunities - in our own person to further achieve 
valued functionings and, secondly, that choosing in it self has a direct role in well-being as it 
makes makes a richer, more "well of" life.117 
 At this point particularly the aspect of efficacy and the hypothetical imperative should 
have an obvious application in the comparison between Kant and the Capabilities Approach. 
As a supersensible being, i.e., a rational being that is also a sensible being, we are 
necessitated not only to the formal lawfullness of the categorical imperative but also to it's 
aspect that illustrate the necessity of our laws to be practical laws; the hypothetical 
imperative. Living in an empirical world we must necessarily will the means if we are to be 
successful in promoting our ends. It is an intrinsic property of the supersensible being that 
this practical aspects is promoted as failing to be efficacious means, as a supersensible being, 
we are failing to be a cause in the world that is not determined by sensible causality; we fail 
at being autonomous. Further, an increase in our efficacy means a larger scope of possible 
means to succeed in and so an increase in possible ends to pursue. Thus, as the hypothetical 	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imperative is an innate part of the categorical imperative considerations of the hypothetical 
imperative falls under the concept of well-beingW, not only instrumentally to achieve more 
well-beingW but that it is also a part of the standard itself of what it means to be human. For a 
supersensible being our efficacy, our success and scope regarding the hypothetical 
imperative, has intrinsic, normative value in reference to the categorical imperative. Yet we 
must still remember that having a good will is the pre-condition of this interrelated 
relationship. Any moral goodness is still ultimately constituted by the function of the will. 
 However, I have yet to make a fuller and more specific account of what Kant has to 
say about how and in what direction we are to grow and develop ourselves as a supersensible 
being, in what way the well-beingW of others are normative to us and how this compare to the 
concept of capabilities and its normativity. Since the concept of capabilities include different 
states and quality of our sensible aspect, such as being adequately nourished and being in 
good health to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, taking 
part in community life and so on118 we must dig some more into Kant to see if, and to what 
extent, his account can be similar and how they differ. It is in the doctrine of virtue in the 
Metaphysics of Morals that we get the richer account of the role and importance of efficacy 
and our sensible aspect. 
 
4.2 Is Kant's moral theory one of duty or one of virtue? 
In the introduction I wrote that while Kant's moral framework is famously known as being 
deontological, or duty ethics, I do believe that the traditional seperation of duty ethics and 
virtue ethics are not, atleast in Kant's case, warranted and that in general virtue is a key 
concept in his moral framework. I think this is particularly evident when we move past the 
metaphysical account of morals and on to how it applies to us as acting agents in the 
empirical world. I believe it is important to assess this if we are to better understand and 
argue for Kant's moral philosophy within well-beingW as what we are and do is constitutive 
this concept. While the previous two chapters was about arguing for a Kantian concept of 
well-beingW arguing for Kant's doctrine of virtue will further support that position while it 
further argues the importance and normativity of efficacy, or capabilities. 
 Another philosopher that argues for the importance of virtue in Kant's moral 
doctrineis Robert Louden, where I now want to present a short version of his most important 
points and arguments before I supply some of my own thoughts on the topic. 	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 Louden writes that one hallmark of virtue ethics is it's strong agent orientation, that 
the primary object of moral evaluation is the agent119 and that for Kant what is unqualified 
good is not an endstate nor certain atomic acts in conformity to rules but rather our will as a 
state of character which becomes the basis for all of one's actions.120 He further writes that 
Kant defines virtue as fortitude to resiste urges and inclinations that are opposed to the moral 
law, that to master ones inclinations and having a constancy of purpose is central to his 
doctrine of virtue and so moral philosophy as such. Because of this continuous and 
unavoidable tension between universal reason and subjective inclination the human will is 
always in conflict and so virtue, the strength of will to master ones inclinations, is key. Virtue 
is at the heart of the ethical for Kant in the sense that it is the basis for all judgements of 
moral worth, not in the sense of following specific acts or rules but to guide one's life by 
respect for rationally legislated and willed laws in accordance with the moral law, i.e. the 
categorical imperative. But, even if duty and respect to law is what is central to Kant, not 
"virtue for the sake of virtue", the very essence of moral law and duty is to assess and judge 
the sensible world by a standard not determiend by sensible causality but rather by the 
activity of reason. As I wrote in section 1.3 Anne Margaret Baxley argued that to judge a 
feeling simply in virtue of how you feel is not being in control of yourself but rather being 
thrown around and dictated by the random circumstances of the world. Kantian virtue is not 
just to be subordinated by the moral law, i.e. living our lives in accordance with reason; 
virtue is even defined by the moral law, that virtue is the strength or force of the will, 
meaning that the virtuous life for Kant is not a life where you are to blindly follow rules but 
rather a life where you actively take control of it.121 To me it seems to make a strong case for 
putting the Kantian moral agent and it's character at the centre of moral evaluation, and if we 
add my previous arguments on the hypothetical imperative, that for supersensible beings 
failing to be efficacious is failing to be autonomous, then I find Loudens account very 
convincing indeed. Duty is the guide of how we ought to act where virtue is our application 
and success in reference to this guide. Regarding well-beingW our active existence is then 
best characterizes as virtue, as living up to the standard (the categorical imperative) of the 
asymmetrical and interdependent relationship between reason and sensibility that is the 
supersensible nature. 
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 Louden continues by pointing out that a traditional way to part Kantian duty ethics to 
that of virtue ethics is to point at motivation, an area where Kant seems to clearly distance 
himself. In virtue ethics we are supposed to be motivated by virtue, virtue for the sake of 
virtue, but for Kant we should be motivated by duty. However, as I have just discussed and 
will go deeper into in the next chapter, Kant's focus on duty is not on spesific acts or rules but 
rather to strive for a way of life in which all of one's acts are a manifistation of a character 
that is in harmony with the moral law. Action by duty in this sense, Louden writes, is action 
motivated by virtue, albeit in a sternly rationalist sense.122 
 For many this account can still be deemed inadequate. Kant still seems to deny 
feelings of charity, friendship, courage and the like to have a role to play in our motivation, 
feelings and motivation which is considered characteristic of any theory of virtue. But, again, 
we can take a look back at Kant's claim that the state of health in the moral life is a tranquil 
mind with a firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice and that, as Baxley argued, a 
cheerful disposition is necessary for virtue. Louden writes that a feeling of joy is to be 
accompanied with virtue, that we are to cultivate a habitually cheerful heart. This is not a 
contradiction to Kant's moral framework in general. The core of Kant's moral doctrine is that 
our will is to be determined by reason, meaning that certain feelings and inclinations that can 
get in the way must be mastered and feelings and inclinations that encourage us to determine 
our will by reason is to be cultivated to assist, or atleast not stand in the way of, our will.123 
Our feelings and inclinations do have an instrumental value in reference to how they affect 
the function of the will, provided that we ultimately act on them for the sake of reason. For 
instance, your love for your friends can help make you aware of your duties towards them 
where complete indifference to others works against recognizing your duty. We must 
however beware of the danger of fooling ourselves into believing that we are acting 
autonomously when we really are determining our will by feelings and inclinations that only 
conform to the moral law but are not determined by it for its own sake. However, Louden 
writes, this is a necessary risk when cultivating virtue.124 
 Another point of departure to analyze Kant's conception of virtue is his commitment 
to the importance of duties to oneself.125 Duties to oneself, Louden writes, are a direct 
application of the imperative always to respect humanity, both in your own person and in the 	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person of any other, as an end in itself. Failing to do so is to throw away one's own humanity 
and no longer being in a position to perform duties to others. This implies that duties to 
oneself are the precondition of all duties. This claim is neither suprising nor really 
complicated when we look thoroughly into Kant. He argues that the crucial concept of duty is 
self-constraint, to gain control over oneself as a rational being, and how can we expect 
someone to do what he ought to do or to be responsible for himself if he is not even in control 
of himself? Kant also define virtue itself in terms of self-constraint, meaning that a 
precondition of any duties and so any moral value is that it must be done from a person with 
the right disposition, i.e. succeeds in being virtuous. Thus in a sense, Louden writes, Kant 
defines duty in terms of virtue, rather than vice versa, as critics often allege.126 Further, why 
duties to oneself is the precondition of all other duties and the principium of all morality is 
because morality does not exist unless and until moral agents develop and exercise their 
capacities of agency, which is an activity we must do by ourselves through our reason. The 
chief capacity for this is self-constraint in virtue of determining your will with your reason, 
not sensible needs or inclinations.127 
 
4.3 A doctrine of virtue 
There is more to be said in support of Kant's moral theory as a theory of virtue. In section 3.3 
I wrote that in the Groundwork Kant argued that for any divine and in general a holy will no 
imperatives would hold as their volition would in itself necessarily be in accord with the 
law.128 In the doctrine of virtue Kant continues on this path by arguing that for any non-holy 
being, meaning one that could be tempted to violate duty, there is a doctrine of virtue.129 This 
is because that, for a being that is necessitated to practical reason, i.e. pure reason observing 
and assessing the sensible world in which he is placed, he is not only subjected to autonomy 
of practical reason but also autocracy of practical reason. Autocracy of practical reason, Kant 
writes: 
 
(...) involves consiousness of the capacity to master one's inclinations when they rebel against the law, 
a capacity which, though not directly perceived, is yet rightly inferred from the moral categorical 
imperative. Thus human morality in its highest stage can still be nothing more than virtue, even if it 
be entirely pure (quite free from the influence of any incentive other than that of duty). In its highest 	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stage it is an ideal (to which one must continually approximate), which is commonly personified 
poetically by the sage.130 
 
Virtue is then mastering one's imperfection of being a rational animal that is constantly 
having the threat of sensible impulses to determine our actions, thus undermining our will. 
This capacity is reasonably inferred from the categorical imperative, I think, because of the 
arguments I made earlier about the hypothetical imperative, that as an aspect of the 
categorical imperative it necessitate us to efficacy if we are to be autonomous at all. Further, 
the highest stage we can aspire to and achieve is to master our sensibility but never 
completely erradicate its potential threats, meaning that virtue and human moral life is a 
constant struggle and activity where we must, because of the necessitation of our will, 
cultivate ourselves to be better human beings. We are not to supress or fight our inclinations 
but to master and cultivate them so that we will have integrity as supersensible beings, that 
we must promote both efficacy and autonomy under the guidence and framework of the form 
of universal law. Again, duty is what we ought to do where virtue is our application and 
success in doing our duty. For Kant these two concepts belong together. 
 Kant provides another way of explaining this capacity that is constituted by our 
intertwined aspects of reason and sensibility. Virtue, he writes, is the strenght of a human 
being's maxims in fulfilling his duty, and the obstacles that determines the strength needed 
are those of natural inclinations that can come into conflict with the human being's moral 
resolution. Virtue is then self-constraint in accordance with a principle of inner freedom.131 
132 The focus here is on our maxims, which he explains in the Groundwork as subjective 
principles of volition that must conform to the objective moral law, i.e. the categorical 
imperative.133 A more familiar way of explaining maxims is that they are subjective, 
particular instances of a "do-this-act-for-the-sake-of-this-end" structure134, being the laws we 
make for ourselves to act on. The strength of our maxims are thus firstly having the maxim 
pass the categorical imperative test, i.e. that it has the form of universal law (that any rational 
being as such could will it in virtue of being rational, i.e. living up the the constitutive 
principle of the will), and second that when we have good maxims we must also successfully 
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enforce them, rendering ourselves efficatious and autonomous. Failing at the means to our 
ends mean we fail at the very maxim itself. 
 Still, while there has been a focus on virtue as self-constraint, where the part of us that 
we are to constrain is our sensible aspect, Kant writes that the true strenght of virtue is a 
tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice.135 
This claim should not be surprising nor particularly controversial to argue for by now as it 
should be firmly established that the interdependent relationship of reason and sensibility, 
which makes out the human condition now known as a supersensible nature, means that 
reason and sensibility are not directly opposed to each other nor competing. The terms self-
control and self-constraint reflects the fact that reason holds the authority of determination 
even though our inclinations make their demands. What Kant objects to in the non-autocratic 
person is not that she has inclinations but that she gives them an authority and privileged 
status that they do not merit in a rational being.136 In themselves inclinations are 
(functionally) good insofar as they maintain our funtion as a sensible being but they cannot 
constitute moral goodness, which is the higher and necessitated authority in a supersensible 
being in virtue of reason. The correct way to view our feelings, inclinations and needs is then 
not that they should be suppressed or overlooked but rather that they should be assessed on 
moral grounds, not be given an authority in themselves as the function of sensible existence 
is not a part of the function of the will. Self-constraint further reflects that only the good will 
can be good without limitation. Anything else is only good by limitation, and these limits and 
constrains are decided by the framework allowed by the good will. Further, that a tranquil 
mind with a considered and firm resolution to put the law of virtue into practice is called the 
true strenght of virtue reflects the fact that the autonomy of the will is intertwined and 
interdependent on the efficacy of our sensible nature, meaning that a true integrity of our 
being is that our sensibility can live up to the maxims that we are willing, both by having it in 
our powers to do the necessary means but also that our personal preferences and inclinations 
does not stand in the way of our will, actively trying to usurp the authority of determination 
for themselves or passively making problems by having a grudgingly attitude toward your 
duty. 
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 Kant further writes that the capacity to set oneself an end is what characterizes 
humanity,137 and with this there follows a duty to cultivate the crude dispositions of our 
nature to promote our capacity to realize all sorts of possible ends.138 Thus, while our 
sensible aspect might tempt us to trangress on our duty we can also cultivate our natural 
abilities and dispositions to respect and so actualize, or realize, what the moral law demands 
of us. Kant writes that there are two things that are necessary for inner freedom, i.e. having a 
good (free) will; one needs to be ones own master and one needs to be ruling oneself. Having 
both these states, he writes, ones character is noble where in the converse states it is mean.139 
It is not enough to just be your own master, to have authority over oneself, but also that you 
actively rule yourself, meaning you are able and responsible for actual changes in the world 
guided by your own autonomy. Ann Margaret Baxley write that the Kantian autocratic agent 
is not one who exaggerate or suppress her feelings and inclinations, nor is she moved or 
(seriously) tempted by feelings or inclinations to disturb the authority of self-rule.140 Acting 
according to duty, but doing so with a cheerful disposition is a sign of moral integrity while 
grudgingly or resistantly acting according to duty indicates a lacking virtue in one's 
character.141 She writes that such a virtuous character involves a well-developed sensible 
nature that is dependent on three factors. First we have to control unruly feelings and 
inclinations, second we have to maintain feelings and inclinations that accord with duty, and 
third we have to cultivate further our natural capacities to feelings and inclinations that 
favour duty. To succeed in doing our duty when inclination makes their claims on us is to 
live virtuously, and since we are unholy, finite beings life can never be anything higher, or 
better, than one of virtue. 
 Even though we are not holy or have empirical knowledge of the existence of any 
such being Kant still writes that a holyness of the will is nevertheless a practical idea that 
must necessarily serve as a model for finite rational beings to aim for. This means that for 
human beings: 
 
" (...) the utmost that finite practical reason can effect is to make sure of this unending progress of 
ones maxims toward this model and of their constancy in continual progress, that is, virtue; and virtue 	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itself, in turn, at least as a naturally aquired ability, can never be completed, because assurances in 
such a case never becomes apodictic certainty and, as persuasion, is very dangerous".142 
 
Since we understand the world through the representation of laws and in accordance with 
ends that are to be good in-and for themselves as a continuous self-maintaining cycle it seems 
reasonable that this unending project is a necessary result of our condition. Even if we cannot 
attain a perfect will the constitutive principle of the will necessitate us to constantly work to 
master our sensible aspect as there is nothing else that has the authority to guide us as being 
good in itself without limitation. The proper moral condition of a human being is virtue, that 
is, moral disposition in conflict, not holiness in the supposed possession of a complete purity 
of dispositions of the will.143 We must live our lives with this conflict knowing that it will 
never end while we still work toward mastering it. 
 
4.4 On autonomy and autocracy 
Ann Margaret Baxley stresses that autocracy is the specific term Kant uses to portray the 
moral self-constraint or self-mastery that virtue entail.144 Failure to acquire autonomy and 
autocracy is to surrender one's authority over oneself, becoming a "plaything"' of the forces 
and impressions of the sensible world, allowing oneself to be dependent on the chance of 
circumstances instead of being subjected to one's own free will.145 Yet there is an important 
difference between the two concepts that we need to be aware of. The best way to 
characterize the difference between autonomy and autocracy, according to Ann Margaret 
Baxley, is that autonomy is the legislative power, the one where we are making good maxims 
for ourselves while autocracy is the executive power, the one that enforces and enacts the 
maxims.146 The good will that render us autonomous represents the core, distinguishing 
feature of a morally good person, but virtue in terms of autocracy is something over and 
above the good will.147 We can make further sense of this by remembering that Kant wrote 
that as only a member of the world of understanding, as a rational being, actions conform to 
the principle of autonomy of the will while as only a member of the sensible world actions 
conform wholly to the law of heteronomy, of inclination and desire. However as a being that 
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is, at the same time, both a rational and a sensible being we do not conform perfectly to the 
principle of the autonomy of the will.148 I believe that while autonomy best describes the 
good will, the function of rational nature, the concept of autocracy better captures the 
function of supersensible nature; to functionally be a good human being we don't merely have 
to be autonomous in our will; we have to be autocratic in terms of having a good will and in 
having an appropriate and adequate efficacy to enforce it. Thus, when we move from the 
mere metaphysics of morals and to its active life for a human (supersensible) being it is 
autocracy that best describes our condition, not merely autonomy. Aquiring virtue in terms of 
autocracy is to realize what makes us human. It is to realize our nature. 
 There is an important similarity I want to draw here to the prior discussion of 
autonomy and efficacy on the one hand and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives on 
the other: While autonomy is a capacity possesed in virtue of our will and is realized by 
practical reason autocracy is aquired and actualized through empirical self-discipline and 
self-cultivation guided by the good will. Now, firstly it is important to note that autonomy is a 
prior and necessary condition of autocracy, but autonomy does not in itself entail autocracy; 
there could exist holy or divine rational beings that perfectly conform to the autonomy of the 
will without any temptations at all. In the case of imperfect rational beings situated in the 
empirical world that could be tempted by (sensible) impulses to transgress duty the self-
legislative powers of autonomy constitutes the framework that provide the limits and 
direction of which we are to cultivate ourselves and discipline ourselves so that our sensible 
being can work in tranquil concert with the authority of the will. Second, since we are 
necessitated to practical laws the strength of our wills are then dependent on two factors; first 
it's own autonomy that render us self-legislative and second on the state and condition of our 
sensible being, rendering us efficacious. As a rational being situated in- and observing the 
empirical world, failing to be efficacious in accordance with the moral law is to fail at being 
autonomous. Thus, our integrity as supersensible beings and our virtue as moral agents 
depend on our success in attaining autocracy where autonomy is a precondition but not the 
complete and sufficient condition. 
 Let's review these considerations with a more concrete and contextualized example. 
Kant writes in the Groundwork that there is a duty to assure one's own happiness as we 
"under pressure from many anxieties and amid unsatisfied needs, could easily become a great 
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temptation to transgression of duty".149 One such duty to ourselves as an animal being is to 
not mutilate ourselves150, yet a familiar phenomenon in modern times is when individuals 
with, for instance, deep depression, anxieties and/or social neglect could turn to indulging in 
self-mutilation like cutting one's own wrists or arms (or other places on the body). This is an 
inclination that could not be approved by the categorical imperative as it undermines our duty 
to ourselves as an animal being yet it can be strong enough to determine and endorse the act 
for some, usurping the rule of reason and so acting without moral worth. As a moral matter 
this is something we would want to discourage and avoid in ones own person and in others. 
However, to overcome such a moral tragedy it is clearly not sufficient for the agent himself to 
simply state his obligations not to cut himself, nor would it be sufficient to simply hear this 
from another person as his natural inclinations is in such a state that it is not so easily 
overcome. It is a matter of pure reason to constitute moral worth, but this clearly cannot be 
the whole story if our sensible being either directly or indirectly can oppose the moral law. 
Kantian ethics is not simply about knowing our duties but also ensuring that we have the 
sufficient states of mind, body and spirit as means to all sorts of possible ends.151 Our 
complete existence as supersensible beings necessitates it. 
 A further point I want to make from this is that Kantian morality is not just about the 
decisions you make then and there in difficult situations but also has a strong interest in how 
we cultivate ourselves as moral beings over time, understanding our minds and bodies so that 
we can prevent states that goes against virtue, promote states that support virtue and, when 
we transgress on duty, how we can rectify it and prevent relapses. How you choose to spend 
your comfortable spare time, if you use it to develop yourself or to simply stay idle and "rust 
away", will obviously impact what you are capable of when the more demanding moral 
situations occur. Further, Kant did write that the (moral) task of anthropology is to identify 
what it is about our particular biological species of rational beings that makes it hard or easy 
for us to act morally.152 A person's capacity, or capability, to avoid self-mutilation is 
determined not only by his knowledge and awareness of the moral law but by that person's 
control and mastery over his own emotional and psychological health, i.e. the condition of his 
animal nature. If we are to respect well-beingW - which is measured by the quality of what 
constitutes our very existence, i.e. the intertwined and asymmetrical relationship of our 	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sensible and rational aspects - then we have to prevent states of mind and body that threaten 
the rule of reason, aiming at reaching a tranquil mind that works in concert with reason. The 
converse would be something that corrodes our very being. I must add that, naturally, in the 
making of these decisions, in making the maxims that we are to act upon, they have to first 
and foremost be in accordance with the moral law, not the empirical considerations in 
themselves. It is easy to follow Schiller's inuition that sensibility must harmonize with 
reason153 as if they were on an equal footing but we must remember that reason and 
sensibility exists in an asymmetrical relation where reason is the function of the will and 
where sensibility can only play a supportive role, never to have moral value in itself. 
 On this account, when arguing more specifically on how we are to go about living our 
lives and socialize with others a plausible approach could be to focus firstly on circumvention 
and facilitation and secondly on further cultivation of states of mind, body and spirit to 
respect the autonomy of the will with a tranquil and joyful disposition. We could however 
object and say that this does not seem all that clear. After all Kant do claim that the moral life 
of human beings, even in its highest stage, cannot be anything more than virtue154, and he 
further argues that virtue is the strenght of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty.155 Is 
it not a contradiction that we are supposed to be both tranquil and joyous while constantly 
showing strenght by fighting the conflict in ourselves? 
 Not necessarily. I do not believe that Kant means that we are to strive for a life with 
as much conflict as possible to show of our strenght of virtue. Rather I think he tries to show 
the opposite, that while virtue is unavoidable and that virtue is best shown, or expressed, 
when facing a struggle the moral "hero" is not one that fights and win a brutal and dramatic 
battle with himself but rather a person that respect and applies the moral law without the 
drama of fighting for his own integrity. Baxley writes that in his lectures on ethics Kant 
argues that the ideal form of virtuous self-governance is where we do it in accordance with 
freely adopted moral principles while possessing an inner freedom that makes triumphs over 
oneself unneccessary.156 Like an autocratic city-state the autocratic and virtuous person is not 
to be in a war with oneself and so need no victory over oneself; we should primarily not look 
to overcome our passions but rather nip them in the bud, to use the best of our ability to avoid 
the threats of conflicts to begin with by cultivating ourselves in accordance with reason, 	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having the good will as the final and ultimate good. Kant's main point regarding virtue as a 
neverending struggle is that there is a constant possibility, or constant threat, of our 
inclinations taking control. How great or small this possibility and threat is depends on our 
autocracy. The Kantian autocratic agent, Baxley writes, is not one who exaggerate or 
suppress her feelings and inclinations, nor is she moved or (seriously) tempted by feelings or 
inclinations to disturb the authority of self-rule.157 We are not talking about a 50-50 chance of 
the agent being able to act morally but rather that the threat is so small that, while it is still 
there, it is negligible. The highest stage of virtue is to reach this relaxed and tranquil state that 
smoothly respect and apply the moral law. 
 
4.5 Why we should be capable 
There is an important difference between Sen's capabilities and Kant's autocracy that need to 
be discussed, and that is capabilities as real opportunities to lead one kind of life or another 
on the one hand and autocracy as willing and enforcing your will on the other. Both concepts 
relate to freedom but they do it in fundamentally different ways that is important to consider. 
 Capability to function, Sen writes, represents various combinations of functionings 
that a person can achieve and so reflects a person's freedom to lead one type of life or another 
that they choose. Capabilities are also more important and normatively central than simply 
achieved functioning.158 This is understandable. If we only were to focus on achieved 
functionings we leave open the question of how people are to be treated to get these 
functionings and we also have to answer whom and to what extent others are to provide 
functionings for each other. Focusing on capabilities however firstly provides dignity to the 
individual, making them as self-sufficient as we can be in an interdependent world and 
society instead of, as Anderson argued against, allowing asymmetrical relationships where 
some have to bow and beg to get their voices heard, being treated as inferiors by others who 
place themselves as superiors. Secondly it allows for the individual to choose and work for 
ones own well-being and further functionings, only demanding from others that they can 
either provide or atleast not actively hinder them from having a certain minimum of 
capabilities.159 Third, capabilities are in different ways a part of our well-being as reflective 
choice and the dignity and independence to act on one's own will makes a richer life. Thus, 	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Sen argues for a freedom as opportunities that are constituted by having the absence of 
empirical considerations, both externally and internally, which could restrict you from 
achieving what you would choose to achieve by your own volition, of what you want to do 
and who you want to be. 
 Kant however, although we can recognize some similarities, had a different idea. 
Capability, or efficacy, is also for Kant an innate property of what makes us who and what 
we are as it directly affects our autocracy as supersensible beings. Having the efficacy in our 
own agency directly impact our moral character, the scope of moral maxims we can actualize 
and enforce. For Kant achieving and expanding the extend of our autocracy is to realize the 
human nature, reaching a higher stage of what we are as an existing being, where ultimately 
any considerations of our sensible aspect and the world we are acting in must be assessed 
through the function of the will: 
 
The lawgiving form, insofar as this is contained in the maxim, is therefore the only thing that can 
constitute a determining ground of the will (...) Thus freedom and unconditional practical law 
reciprocally imply each other.160 
 
Freedom of the will is freedom from what is empirically determined but it is still a causality 
in it own right, i.e., it contains limitations. This is why we can argue that there is a freedom of 
the will while acknowledging sensible causality, but this freedom has to be understood in 
terms of duty and limitations. Freedom of the will is not "freedom to do what you want" and 
so the Kantian moral framework reaches a different conlusion than that of the Capabilities 
Approach. The very idea of freedom as "doing what you want" becomes a contradiction 
within Kant's philosophy as "what you want" is just a result of sensible causality, not 
something you, as a unified supersensible whole, has decided worthy on grounds other that 
sensible determinism. "What I want" is just consciousness of a sensible reaction of your 
circumstances, not an expression of your personality as a supersensible being. For Kant what 
you want has no moral authority in itself, only what you can will, and so our autocracy can 
never be a pre-condition to promote our preferences. While there is latitude on how to live 
our lives, that we can make personal objects of choice the matter of our maxims, they are 
only permissible if the maxims have the form of universal law. Our efficacy, or capabilities, 
is ultimately for the sake of the moral law, of the function of the will. 
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5. Duty, universality and well-being 
 
5.1 Duty and virtue 
A key concept in Kant is duty and in any asessment of Kant's moral philosophy I find it 
relevant to include some attention to it as it is at the heart of normativity and the 
supersensible condition. Particularly for my own project I find such an assessment necessary 
in order to defend the Kantian account of well-beingW and capabilities to further pursue well-
beingW where our capabilities is also a constitutive part of said well-beingW. The third and 
last criteria I made in the introduction states that such an account must be established within 
the traditional Kantian framework of duty and universal law. Even though the previous 
chapters has strongly implied an answer to this criteria I will further defend my Kantian 
account of well-beingW in this chapter by arguing how and why duty and the universality of 
the will is a necessary result of what is means to be a supersensible being. 
 Firstly, the term "duty" has met a lot of hostility and has been a target for much of the 
criticism turned towards Kant. Initially the word "duty" can have negative associations that in 
turn can affect how we interpret the word and what we believe it will amount to in moral 
philosophy. Marcia Baron writes that the word duty brings to mind associations such as 
having to pay your taxes, return borrowed items promtly, keeping appointments and the like. 
The word suggests tasks that one performs perfunctorily, such as institutional responsibilities 
and expectations that one has to live up to. Terms such as "military duty" further adds to the 
word being related to something external that is forced upon you whose authority you have to 
follow almost blindly and without question, limiting your freedom to do what you really 
want.161 Much of the interpretations and subsequent criticism of Kant seems to have adopted 
this view and questioned where this "external" obligation comes from. For instance, if we are 
our own lawmakers that also can revise our laws and make new ones, how can we really be 
obligated to ourselves in any meaningful way? But, as I will show shortly, for Kant duty is 
not external or something to be followed blindly, nor does it limit your freedom. It will turn 
out to be quite the opposite. 
 Kant writes that the good will, as the only thing that is good without limitation, must 
be the condition of every other good, even of all the demands of happiness.162 He further 	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writes that cultivation of reason, which is requisite and unconditional, limits in many ways 
the attainment of happiness, which is always conditional. That is not to say that happiness is 
bad - I have mentioned earlier that we have an indirect duty to secure our happiness to avoid 
trangression on the moral law and that a tranquil mind is a sign of moral integrity - but that it 
is always conditional and subordinate to the activity of reason. So, Kant writes, in order to 
explicate the concept of a will that is to be esteemed in itself under certain subjective 
limitations and hinderances (sensible inclinations) he sets before himself the concept of 
duty.163  
 The key to understanding duty is to remember that as supersensible beings we are 
unholy, i.e., it is always possible for our inclinations to conflict with the moral law164 and so 
tempt us to determine our will based on their (inappropriate) authority. The argument should 
be familiar by now: We are necessitated to our will and we can be either good or bad at it's 
characteristic activity. Since the constitutive principle of the will itself, its function, is 
lawfullness then our only option as a being that have freedom from sensible causality in our 
agency is to follow it's command, i.e., it's imperative. Thus, duty as self-constraint is not self-
denial but rather freedom as taking control of your agency. As argued in section 4.5, our 
freedom from sensible causality is by turning to rational causality, meaning we have to 
restrict our sensible impulses when determining our will if we are to be acting freely. As a 
supersensible nature, to follow duty is really to be human in a more complete sense. It is, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, how we ought to act where virtue is our application and 
success of it. 
 Christine Korsgaard writes that if we are to act as agents, as someone whom we can 
attribute the movement to as being its responsible author, then the act needs to be an 
expression of a unified self, not just a product of some force that is at work on or in the 
agent.165 This is applicable to my previous arguments on supersensible nature and virtue as 
being autocratic; when we act it has to be from an integrated whole, a myself who acts, and as 
a constitutive element of our human condition is the activity of self-conscious deliberation, 
which is an activity in itself independent of our animal nature, then we have to be good at this 
to be something more than just a aninmal acting on instinct and initial reaction in virtue of 
sensible causality. Ann Margaret Baxley writes that duty has a regulative role that guarantee 
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that our actions accords with moral considerations166, and as the categorical imperative itself 
is not an explicit rule but rather a test to evaluate the moral value of your maxims167 - i.e., 
that they have the form of universal law - then morality can rightly be called an obligation 
and a restriction because we are necessitated to restrict our initial (sensible) impulses and 
inclinations if we are to be responsible and willing agents at all. 
 While inclinations and empirical considerations do make out the matter of our 
maxims it is the moral law that constitutes its form, giving our actions moral value. In The 
Metaphysics of Morals, in what I take to be a critical passage regarding the role and nature of 
duty, Kant writes that the very concept of duty is already the concept of a necessitation of 
free choice through the law.168 He writes that this constraint that duty is supposed to be is 
made known through the categorical nature of the moral imperative. In other words, when we 
view reason as an activity in itself that we are necessitated to, independent and preceding of 
what our sensible needs, preferences and inclinations are, then we obviously have to restrain 
any sensible impulses that threaten the internal organization of reason that makes out a good 
will. Since the will is the source of everything that is good then ensuring the internal 
organization of the good will is primary. Duty is then buildt into our very existence as 
supersensible beings; it is an internal property, or qualification, of what it means to be 
human. 
 Duty is thus important to virtue and normativity in general. Duty and constraints are 
though only applicable to rational imperfect beings, i.e. supersensible beings as they are those 
that are, according to Kant, unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral 
law or following it reluctantly even though they recognize its authority.169 For any holy or 
divine rational being duty would be nonexistance because they would automatically conform 
to the autonomy of reason. Since the moral law is given by pure reason it applies also to all 
finite rational beings in virtue of being rational, and for any finite rational being, like the 
human being, the law has the form of an imperative. This is because that even though we can 
presuppose a pure will it can still be challenged and affected by sensible needs and motives, 
meaning it will never be a holy will, that is, a will that would not be capable of having any 
maxims conflicting with the moral law. So for finite, rational beings the moral law is: 
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 (...) an imperative that commands categorically because the law is unconditional; the relation 
of such a will to this law is dependence under the name of obligation, which signifies a necessitation, 
though only by reason and its objective law, to an action which is called duty because a choice that is 
pathologically affected (though not thereby determined, hence still free) brings with it a wish arising 
from subjective causes, because of which it can often be opposed to the pure objective determining 
ground and thus needs a resistance of practical reason which, as moral necessitation, may be called an 
internal but intellectual constraint.170 
 
Kant further writes that the moral law for the will of a perfect being is a law of holiness, but 
for the will of a finite rational being it is a law of duty, of moral necessitation and of the 
determination of his action through respect for this law and reverence for his duty.171 This 
makes sense. After all, both "duty" and "ought" are terms that only make sense when there is 
a struggle or conflict where there is supposed to be a standard that identifies the right, or 
good, choice. If there were no struggles or conflicts between considerations to determine our 
will we would perfectly conform to our constitutive principles; for rational existence it is 
autonomy and for sensible existence heteronomy. As a supersensible existence however we 
need to work towards autocracy: We have a consicousness of the causality of the will, which 
constitutes a freedom from the causality of sensible nature. We are aware that we can act 
from grounds that are not based on inclinations in themselves. This awareness of a freedom 
of the will in turn makes us conscious of the struggle to determine our will by reason instead 
of inclination. This struggle is unavoidable and neverending but we still must, or have a duty 
to, determine our will by reason in virtue of necessitation. As members of the intelligible 
world that at the same time regard ourselves as members of the sensible world our moral 
"ought" is simply the necessary "will".172 Since this directly apply to our constitutive 
principle as supersensible beings, to the categorical imperative, then it is also constitutive of 
our well-beingW. 
 Kant writes that as it is the impulses of nature that make out the obstacles in a 
human's mind to his fullfilment of duty the capacity and considered resolve to withstand what 
opposes the moral disposition within us is virtue. He further writes that the part of the general 
doctrine of duties that brings inner freedom under laws is then a doctrine of virtue173, arguing 
that duty and virtue is closely connected. Virtue is the doctrine considering our capacity to 	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bring about inner freedom, being more than just descriptive of the metaphysics of what 
morality is but also a more specific guide on what the moral and free life consists of by also 
including our sensible abilities, our capabilities. This guide is appropriately characterizes by 
the terms duty, obligation and limitation as only by restricting our sensible impulses can we 
be respecting the moral law and truly act freely as ourselves. 
 
5.2 Universality of the will and law-making 
The previous account of duty easily meets the objection that argues, "if a lawgiver has the 
authority to make laws then the same lawgiver should also be able to undo them or revise 
them, thus never really be under any obligations". Kant anticipated this problem, writing that 
if the "I" that imposes obligation were also the one whom is put under obligation we would 
meet a contradiction.174 What this objection fails to do is to understand the metahysical 
properties that the Kantian account hold. The ultimate authority of lawmaking is not in the 
preferences or opinion of the lawmaker but in his will, and as the function and normative 
standard that constitute willing is an internal property of rational activity this means that there 
are formal restrictions of what qualifies as a law at all, independent of the lawmaker herself 
as a sensible being. The objection seems to suppose that as lawmakers we make laws on a 
whim, having the law being whatever we sensibly fancy at the moment without being 
subjected to a universal standard of what qualifies as at law. As our own lawmakers we make 
maxims, but a maxim only qualifies as a law if it passes the test of the categorical imperative, 
and this is where we fundamentally are restricted. Kant writes: 
 
If a rational being is to think of his maxims as practical universal laws, he can think of them only as 
principles that contain the determining ground of the will not by their matter but only by their form. 
 The matter of a practical principle is the object of the will. This is either the determining 
ground of the will or it is not. If it is the determining ground of the will, then the rule of the will is 
subject to an empirical condition (to the relation of the determining representation to the feeling of 
pleasure or displeasure), and so is not a practical law. Now, all that remains of a law if one seperates 
from it everything material, that is, every object of the will (as its determining ground), is the mere 
form of giving universal law. Therefore, either a rational being cannot think of his subjectively 
practical principles, that is, his maxims, as being at the same time universal laws or he must assume 
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that their mere form, by which they are fit for a giving of universal law, of itself and alone makes 
them practical laws.175 
 
While our maxims contains empirical considerations as it's matter the maxim is to be 
determined by the form of universal law, which is a standard that does not belong to the 
empirical world. This means that we are restricted from the very beginning in virtue of the 
function of reason before we even deliberate about means and ends in reference to the 
empirical world and sensible inclinations. 
 Kant further writes that the problem we are faced with, supposing that the will is free, 
is that we need to find the law that alone is competent to determine it necessarily: 
 
Since the matter of a practical law, that is, an object of maxim, can never be given otherwise than 
empirically whereas a free will, as independent of empirical conditions (i.e., conditions belonging to 
the sensible world), must nevertheless be determinable, a free will must find a determining ground in 
the law but independently of the matter of the law. But, besides the matter of the law, nothing further 
is contained in it than the lawgiving form. The lawgiving form, insofar as this is contained in the 
maxim, is therefore the only thing that can constitute a determining ground of the will (...) Thus 
freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other."176 
 
Kant is very explicit on this point, repeating himself over and over to make sure it sticks. The 
will, he writes, is thought as independent of empirical conditions and hence, as a pure will, as 
determined by the mere form of law, and this determining ground is to be regarded as the 
supreme condition of all maxims. Further, since pure reason is practical of itself and alone it 
gives (to the human being) a universal law, which we call the moral law.177 The moral law is 
the constitutive principle of a rational view on the empirical world, of cognizing the world 
through the representation of laws and ends, and as an existence in itself rational activity, 
which is necessitated, commands absolutely. Further: 
 
Now it is indeed undeniable that every volition must also have an object and hence a matter; but the 
matter is not, just because of this, the determining ground and condition of the maxim; for if it is, then 
the maxim cannot be presented in the form of giving universal law, since expectation of the existence 
of the object would then be the determining cause of choice, and the dependence of the faculty of 
desire upon the existence of some thing would have to be put at the basis of volition; and since this 	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dependence can be sought only in empirical conditions, it can never furnish the basis for a necessary 
and universal rule.178 
 
When we discuss the will and lawmaking in Kant we must not confuse "what I want" with 
"what I will". Reviewing ones preferences and weighing them against each other to end up 
with pursuing one of them is not the same as willing. To will something you must conform to 
the moral law because that is what the functional activity of willing is. What you want is a 
result of sensible causality; what you will can only be a result of rational causality. The 
former can furnish the matter of our maxims but only the latter can determine them by having 
lawgiving form, yet the challenges of living morally occur since we do not conform to the 
causality of reason as easily as we do to the causality of our sensibility. Thus, the authority of 
endorsing or rejecting your preferences and inclinations are not to be found within your 
sensible impulses or preferences but rather outside of that sensible causality, i.e., by the 
function of reason. 
 While we are to determine our will for the sake of reason if we are to be willing and 
so act freely at all our will and our maxims are, in one sense, not really limited as being "our 
own." While every human being might have different inclinations and preferences we do 
have one thing in common, and that is this rational activity that constitute the will. How we 
do this activity is apparently very different from person to person where we can be better or 
worse at doing it in highly diverse ways, but it's constitutive principle and so the normative 
standard that comes along with it is still objective and applies to every rational being. As I 
argued earlier in section 2.4, reason is self-conscious activity and, even though we observe 
our own sensible constitution, what we observe in ourselves does not define or constitute the 
ability or activity of observation in itself. Any self-directed activity such as reason is to be 
normatively judged in itself, not by what it produces or results in. 
 As rational beings we all share this activity constituted by the moral law, and this has 
important consequences. It means that any maxims that is determined for the sake of the 
moral law qualifies as an obligation in general, meaning it has authority and so is binding for 
every finite, rational being in virtue of its lawfullness. When asking, "how ought I to act", one 
is really asking, "how ought any person, being a person as such, to act". How we ought to act 
when interacting with ourselves and how we are to act when interacting with others are, 
ontologically speaking, the same. Maxims that lives up to the categorical imperative are 
normative for everyone independent of whom makes them because they have their authority 	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in virtue of being a universal law, a causality that is independent of empirical considerations 
and so shared between every rational being even though they also are sensible. Granted, 
maxims are subjective in terms of their matter being chosen by subjective sensible causality, 
for instance "I shall visit my friend at the hospital because I want him to feel better", but any 
maxim is still made universal by being determined by reason, having the form of universal 
law. This is how we assess and are to live in reference to the empirical world that we are 
situated in. Now, this does not mean that everyone has to visit my friend at the hospital or that 
they ought to get a hospitalized friend themselves that they can visit because my maxim is 
lawgiving to everyone; it only means that my maxim is normative to them in the sense that 
they cannot deny or hinder me in doing that action. They are obligated to not stop me from 
pursuing my end. 
 I believe the same argument is made by Christine Korsgaard. She writes that our 
reasons must be public reasons179, meaning that they have a force not based on our private 
interests but that it belongs to everyone and so can be normative for everyone. We must be 
able to take another's reason as our own, and vica versa. She writes that "if I am to think that I 
have a reason to shoot you, I must be able to will that you should shoot me." Only this 
conception of reasons can be universalized and have a normative force that promotes the 
autonomy of the individual. To treat a person as an end in him-or herself is to treat them as a 
source of reasons, i.e. as them having a will that is legislative for yourself.180 The only way 
that someone else can have a legislative force on me is when they are willed autonomously, 
and when I am recognizing a normative maxim, independent of its origin, I am only acting 
autonomously when respecting it. To not do so would be to make an exception of myself 
because of my own sensible inclinations and so failing at conforming to my constitutive 
principle as a supersensible existence in virtue of failing at my rational aspect. 
 Again we must remember that there is a difference between "wanting" and "willing". 
In Korsgaards example, if I were to think that I have reason to shoot you I must also be able 
to will that you should shoot me. The maxim here does not fail because I obviously would 
not want anyone to shoot me. It fails because of its practical contradiction; it undermines the 
self-maintaining form of my supersensible nature that is an end in itself. In a similar example, 
one of wanting to end one's own life, Kant writes that the maxim is determined when we ask 
ourselves what it would have to be in order that a nature should maintain itself in accordance 
with such a law. It is obvious that in such a nature no one could end his life at will because 	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such an arrangement would not be an "enduring natural order".181 In other words, as nature 
means the existence of things under laws, the immorality of ending ones own life is that it is 
contrary to an internal, self-maintaining order that has a constitutive law, or principle. As a 
supersensible nature it is not only contrary to our sensible nature but, most importantly, to the 
rational nature of our will. While someone could, through their sensibility, want to end their 
life it is really impossible to will such an end, as it would be a direct contradiction to the very 
nature of what having a will is; it is contrary to lawfullness. 
 This account of universality means that since universality is in the function of the will 
we are bound by it independent of what other rational beings actually do. Other people's 
agreeableness or ability to obey the law is not relevant when you are assessing a maxim; only 
the moral law itself is to be the standard and point of reference when evaluating a maxim, 
meaning that even if a majority of people rejects a moral maxim it could never serve as a 
ground to excuse you from the moral maxim. That others make themselves exeptions to the 
moral law is irrelevant when you are assessing it yourself. The value and universality of a 
moral maxim is not determined or changed by the number of people living up to it, nor is it 
changed by any other empirical consideration. 
 But how are we to act when facing someone that, for instance, is harming others? 
How does "the enduring order of things" relate to such an experience when harm in itself is 
not a moral bad? The answer is two-folded. Any actions that do undermine the natural order 
of things as argued above is not a moral action, meaning it is not binding or demanding 
respect from anyone; we are not obligated to let it happend. Secondly, we are actually 
obligated to hindering such actions. Kant writes that whatever diminishes the hindrances to 
an activity is a furthering of this activity itself182, meaning that hindering those that harm 
others is to promote the well-beingW of the same individuals. It is furthering the activity of 
being a supersensible being. Causing or avoiding causing harm, like many other acts, is not 
bound by an absolute rule as the moral law and duty is to be understood in reference to the 
function of reason, not "rules". Kant does, after all, refer to the moral law as "the test as to the 
form of a law of nature in general"183, meaning the representation of laws and ends, not 
certain acts in themselves without reference to an end. Hindering the harming of others is 
however an obligation as we could never will the degradation of the function of supersensible 
nature. As I have argued earlier, our sensible aspect is also a constitutive part of our existence 	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and so sensible considerations are a part of our function. We must take care of it within the 
lawfullness of the good will. 
 
5.3 Universality and the well-being of ourselves and others 
Even though there is a universality of the will that connects all rational beings to each other 
we are still not bound or obligated to each other as if we were the same person. Even though 
"my maxim" is normative to any rational being in virtue of being rational we are still 
seperated in a fundamental way in virtue of our supersensible nature; as I argued in section 
4.2, for Kant duties to oneself is the precondition of all other duties, even the duties of virtue 
to others, which I believe is best understood by the metaphysical necessitation of duty, or 
self-constraint. As self-constraint can only be done by a "myself" we cannot relate to others 
as if they, metaphysically speaking, were ourselves. Thus, since morality is an inner activity 
that you do by yourself we cannot have any obligations to the perfection of others as that is 
an obligation only they can have to themselves. Still we do have obligations to others, i.e., to 
their well-beingW, in virtue of the universality of maxims. We can see all this more clearly if 
we look into the duties to oneself first, which will also further illuminate the normative 
framework of a Kantian accound of well-beingW. 
 Kant divides the duties to oneself into two main categories: 
 
The only objective division of duties to oneself will, accordingly, be the division into what is formal 
and what is material in duties to oneself. The first of these are limiting (negative) duties; the second, 
widening (positive duties to oneself). Negative duties forbid a human being to act contrary to the end 
of his nature and so have to do merely with his moral self-preservation; positive duties, which 
command him to make a certain object of choice his end, concern his perfecting of himself. Both of 
them belong to virtue, either as duties of omission (sustine et abstine) or as duties of commission 
(viribus concessis utere), but both belong to it as duties of virtue. The first belong to the moral health 
(ad esse) of a human being as object of both his outer senses and his inner senses, to the preservation 
of his nature in its perfection (as receptivity). The second belong to his moral prosperity (ad melius 
esse, opulentia moralis), which consists in possessing a capacity sufficient for all his ends, insofar as 
this can be acuired; they belong to his cultivation (active perfecting) of himself.184 
 
Let's first look at the negative duties. The negative duties concernes what is formal, meaning 
that they refer to our internal organization, our function, and so naturally concerns our 	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preservation both as an animal being and as a rational, moral being. Since we are 
supersensible beings both aspects asymmetrically intertwined constitutes us and so the 
preservation of both in accordance with a good will becomes a duty. These duties are then 
also limiting and forbidding as the normativity is grounded in us exist as something good in-
and for ourselves through our function, meaning that we are limited to only do that which 
does not work against our internal organization that make out our existence. These duties are 
also known as perfect duties where I believe that the term "perfection" is to illustrate that they 
are absolute and fundamental to every supersensible being in terms of forbidding anything 
that goes against it. Conversely the wide and imperfect duties, that I will return to shortly, are 
duties that naturally has a much larger scope in how they are to be promoted as they are 
based on subjective differences, such as my own particular talents and sensible abilities. 
These must then leave latitude in how we can choose to approach them as individuals. 
 The perfect and limiting duties are duties we have to the preservation of ourselves as 
an animal being and as a moral being. Our duty to ourselves as an animal being is to preserve 
our animal nature. Actions contrary to this are a willful death (passively allowing oneself to 
succumb), killing oneself totally (suicide) or partially killing oneself by mutilation.185 This 
duty is an obvious one concerning all the previous arguments of this paper. The hypothetical 
imperative is just capturing an aspect of the categorical imperative, our constitutive principle, 
and so is a part of it. Thus, completely erradicating or in any way actively diminishing our 
sensible abilities is a practical contradiction to our particular form of (supersensible) 
existence and so is a practical contradiction to our well-beingW. Death or diminished sensible 
abilities is a disintegration of what we are and so we could never will it, it is contrary to 
ourselves as an end in ourselves. 
 However, even though this is an absolute duty there are empirical considerations that 
somewhat complicates this. For instance, Kant asks if a person who tok his own life after 
being bitten by a mad dog, concerned that he could harm others by his own madness, was 
right or wrong in doing so.186 A more familar example we could make is to amputate an 
infected arm that we cannot cure before the infection spreads further into the body. The 
victim would then lose an arm but save his life. In this sense we can further see that Kant's 
moral theory is not absolute in terms of specific acts, only in terms of ends. Kant recognizes 
that there are empirical considerations that make moral life complicated but that not a threat 
to Kant's moral framework of duty. It is not the state of the empirical world that define moral 	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value but how we relate to it, the activity of our will. If the situation we are in does not leave 
room for us to will in a morally beneficial way for the sensible aspect of our being then this 
failure will not be because of our own lack of willpower. The will, even though it 
accomplishes nothing, "then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has 
its full worth in itself".187 
 Regarding our duty to ourselves as a moral being, Kant writes, we have duties to that 
which is opposed to lying, avarice and false humility.188 This duty consists in the formal 
consistency of the maxims of our will, meaning a prohibition against depriving our 
prerogative of a moral being, i.e. having inner freedom, and so avoid becoming a mere 
plaything of inclinations.189 The greatest violation of a human being's duty to himself as a 
moral being, Kant writes, is lying, or that which is contrary to truthfulness. By lying a person 
is violating the dignity of his humanity. The crime is not in any harm that may occur but 
rather his annihilation of his dignity as a human being.190 It is however not clear if Kant is 
refering to lying to oneself, lying to others or if he means both. Still, the first two alternatives 
and so subsequently the third one qualify as being incompatible with the function of the will. 
Lying to oneself is giving one's own preferences the authority of determination, using onself 
merely as a means by doing what is preferable instead of respecting the autonomy of the will. 
This is however different from merely being wrong. Having (unintentionally) false 
knowledge or beliefs but a good will that is respecting the moral law as an end in itself is still 
having a good will. Similarly, by lying to others you commit the same wrong as when you are 
lying to yourself; you are treating a rational being merely as a means and not as an end in 
itself to further your own sensible interests. As I argued in section 5.2, maxims in interacting 
with yourself and in interacting with another rational being is, ontologically speaking, the 
same. 
 Moving on to the positive duties these duties concerns with what is material, meaning 
that it refers to making certain empirical considerations our ends. These empirical 
considerations, as objects of choice, must however be something that positively affects our 
virtue, i.e., something that has a positive effect on us in virtue of our standard of a 
supersensible being; on something that promotes our autocracy. After all, as a supersensible 
being we must concern ourselves with our efficacy in the world in which we are acting and 	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autonomously assessing. As I argued at the end of section 4.3, even though we are not holy or 
have empirical knowledge of the existence of any such being Kant still writes that a holyness 
of the will is nevertheless a practical idea that must necessarily serve as a model for finite 
rational beings to aim for. As we understand the world through the representation of laws we 
have no other choice than to promote this end at the best of our abilities until we exist no 
more, working towards our own perfection by mastery of our sensible aspect guided by a 
good will. 
 Now, these widening duties are also what I earlier called imperfect duties, where their 
imperfection is in the wide scope it has to provide if it is to be applicable to the subjective 
individual that is to perfect oneself with reference to one's own particular supersensible 
constitution. We have different talents, abilities, strenghts and weaknesses and so there must 
necessarily be a high diversity in how different people are to approach this duty. Kant also 
divides these duties into two kinds. The first are duties to our natural perfection while the 
second is to our moral perfection. 
 Our duty to our natural perfection nicely reflects earlier assessments on the 
hypothetical imperative. Kant writes that as human beings we have a duty to cultivate our 
natural powers of spirit, mind and body as means to all sorts of possible ends. This is 
something we owe ourselves as rational beings, that our sensible aspects ought to be able to 
support ends we can and should set for ourselves in the future.191 While our duty to ourselves 
as an animal being forbids certain actions and so works as a restriction our duty to our moral 
perfection is an encouragement to master ourselves as autocratic, moral beings. This makes it 
a wide and imperfect duty as the duty cannot dictate the kind or extent of the actions 
themselves, meaning there is latitude to choose for oneself the path for perfection.192 We 
must become familiar with our own talents, abilities and limitations and then autonomously 
choose on these empirical circumstances with the perfectioning of ourselves as autocratic, 
supersensible beings as the end. 
 Next, our duty to our moral perfection concerns our disposition to duty, meaning that 
the moral law is in itself the lone incentive and that our actions are done not only in 
conformity with duty but from duty. This duty, Kant writes, is narrow and perfect in terms of 
its quality but wide and imperfect in terms of its degree, meaning that as frail, unholy beings 
we have a duty to strive for this perfection but not expect to achieve it, making it a duty that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:444 
192 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:446 
	   75	  
only consists in continual progress but never completion.193 This echoes the earlier claims 
about virtue, where Kant held that virtue is mastering one's imperfection of being a rational 
animal that is constantly having the threat of sensible impulses to determine our actions and 
that virtue is the strenght of a human being's maxims in fulfilling his duty. In its highest stage 
human morality cannot be anything more than virtue. Further, as Robert Louden wrote, we 
must beware of the danger of fooling ourselves into believing that we are acting 
autonomously when we really are determining our will by feelings and inclinations that only 
conform to the moral law but are not determined by it for its own sake. This is however a 
necessary risk when cultivating virtue.194 
 These examples of duties to oneself from The Metaphysics of Morals reflect the 
examples of perfect and imperfect duties from the Groundwork.195 There Kant firstly argues 
that if a person feels sick of life and wants to end it, but recognizes that such a principle of 
(sensible) self-love is inconsistent as a universal law of nature, then he must reject it. 
Secondly he argues that if I were to feel urged to borrow money and had to make a false 
promise to get it I also would have to recognize that such a maxim would be inconsistent with 
a universal law of nature. Thirdly he argues that if I were to have a talent that could be used 
and cultivated as a means to be useful for all sorts of means, but rather wants to live a 
comfortable life instead, I would recognize that such a maxim would not be a direct 
contradiction to a universal law of nature but that I still never could will such a maxim to be a 
universal law. The first example obviously fits with the perfect duty of self-preservation as an 
animal being, the second to the perfect duty of self-preservation as a moral being and the 
third one to the imperfect duty of our moral prosperity. 
 I have however yet to assess the fourth and last example from the Groundwork that is 
also argued for by Kant in the Metaphysics. In the Groundwork Kant argues that if a person 
who is living well were to see others that struggles with a difficult life and were to make his 
indifference to them a universal law of nature he would also see that this could not be so. He 
writes that while the human race still could subsist by such a maxim it would still be 
impossible to will such a maxim to hold as a universal law because a will that decides this 
would conflict with itself.196 We have seen this argument before in the previous section. 
Korsgaard made a similar example, that if I were to choose to shoot someone I would also 	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have to will them to shoot me also. I also argued that how we ought to act when interacting 
with ourselves and how we are to act when interacting with others are, ontologically 
speaking, the same. Maxims are not normative in reference to its material, its objects of 
choice, but of its form. We cannot make ourselves or others exceptions from the law, and 
since we necessarily has to act in accordance with laws we are, in this way, connected and 
have the same ontological status regarding normativity of maxims. 
 In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant refer to this imperfect duty as duties of virtue to 
others.197 Our duty to others is divided in two parts. The first is the maxim of love as 
benevolence, which is a duty that is meritorious and ment to bring human beings closer to 
one another. The second is the maxim of respect as limiting our own self-esteem by the 
dignity of humanity in another person, which is a duty that is owed and ment to keep us at a 
distance from one another.198 It is important to note that both love and respect in these cases 
must not be understood as sensibly determined feelings but rather as maxims of the will. 
Regarding love Kant writes that we have duties of beneficence, gratitude and sympathy199 
while on respect we have duties against the vices of arrogance, defamation and ridicule.200 
While these two kinds of duty can exist seperately, that you can performing the one kind but 
not the other and that you can assess them independent of each other, they both count as one 
type of duty, duty to others, where both are necessary to succeed in it. Should you fail in one 
of them then we are left with "nothingness".201 
 Our duty to others are then both a maxim of attraction and of repulsion, commanding 
us to have a morally appropriate respect and distance to eachother as independent, 
responsible, moral beings while at the same time making us have a morally appropriate love 
as beneficence to make sure the distance is not to big, that we do not become indifferent to 
other rational beings that we are connected to in virtue of being rational. I believe that this 
duty of virtue to others fits perfectly with the previous accounts in this chapter on duty and 
universality. Since moral life fundamentally consists in duties to oneself we must have the 
appropriate distance to one another, not being paternalistic, as we don't have the authority to 
make decisions on the behalf of other capable rational beings. Moral life as self-legislation is 
to govern ourselves and we must respect this not only in ourselves but in others also as they 
are rational beings just as ourselves. Yet, since the normativity of maxims is in their form, of 	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lawfullness itself, we are bound to one another in terms of what I am willing in regard to 
others have the same normative status as if I was willing it in regard to myself, or if someone 
else was willing it in regard to me or anyone else. Moral reasons are personal and subjective 
in their matter but universal in their form, being normative for every rational being. In other 
words, any maxim that passes the categorical imperative test, the constitutive principle of 
supersensible beings, are equally normative for every rational being. 
 In this way we could say that the well-beingW of others are normative to us in virtue 
of the universality of maxims, but this must then be understood with some important 
limitations. Within the Capabilities Approach it is postulated that we have an intrinsic value 
as human beings in virtue of functionings and so each person is to be considered and treated 
equally by this; the well-being of others becomes normative to us because of this intrinsic 
value. Yet, since the value-object is not primarily achieved well-being but rather capabilities 
as real opportunities we cannot have the same responsibility to increase the well-being of 
others as we have for ourselves. On the Kantian account we also cannot, as in the Capabilities 
Approach, have the same responsibility to the well-beingW of others as we have to ourselves, 
but for Kant this is because, as I just argued, moral life is characterized as self-limitation 
through self-legislation. The central point of well-beingW constituted by the categorical 
imperative is to be self-legislating, meaning that this is something only the individual can do 
for oneself. This means that, for instance, paternalism for the sake of the well-beingW of 
others becomes a practical contradiction; it undermines a central property of what well-
beingW is, namely autocratic agency. Yet, as we are connected through the universality of 
maxims we do have an obligation to facilitate for the well-beingW of others, to encourage it 
and not be disinterested in other but never interfere by trying to take direct control on their 
behalf. Since the morally good maxims of others are normative to us we are obligated to 
respect these expressions of autocratic agency by others, and since the diminishing of any 
hindering of an activity is to promote that activity we are obligated to interfere when a 
supersensible being is being undermined. After all, seeing someone being a victim and being 
indifferent to it or in any other way wanting to avoid interfering cannot be willed as a 
universal law of nature. We are then atleast indirectly obligated, but still obligated, to the 
prosperity and preservation of the well-beingW of others by our direct obligation to ourselves 
as a self-legislating rational being that is to determine our will for the sake of reason. 
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Summary and conclusion 
 
In the introduction I wrote that if we are to identify a plausible reading of Kant's moral 
philosophy in terms of well-beingW we must met three criteria. 
 Firstly I had to make an account of well-being in terms of what a human life is, of 
what constitutes our very being and the lives we live. Kant's account, I have argued, is that 
we are functionally cognized as a supersensible nature that, in virtue of being a self-organized 
being, can be good or bad in-and for itself. Our rational and sensible aspects are 
asymmetrically intertwined, making out a single kind of existence constituted by the 
categorical imperative where reason render us autonomous and mastery over our sensibility 
render us efficacious, realizing our nature as something that can be good in-and for itself as a 
free being. Our well-beingW, our quality and succees in doing and being what we are, is 
constituted by this standard. 
 Secondly I needed to make an account of having capabilities to pursue well-being that 
is connected to our constitutive elements, meaning it represents having real opportunities in 
one's own agency that is also constitutive of what we are and so also normative to us. I 
argued that on the Kantian account the supersensible nature is best characterized by 
autocracy, meaning that to act freely and to realize our nature our maxims cannot merely 
have the form of universal law; we must also suceed in applying them. For the supersensible 
being situated in the empirical world failing to be efficacious is failing to act autonomously, 
meaning that the state and abilities of our sensible aspect directly affect our success as a 
rational being. This also means that to increase our capabilities of mind, spirit and body 
means an increase in our scope of possible moral maxims, increasing our autocracy and so 
becoming more human in virtue of promoting and securing our self-maintaining function as 
an end in itself. Increased autocracy is increased well-beingW. 
 The third and last criteria was that I had to argue for the previous two criterias within 
the normative foundation of Kant, showing that they are not only permissible according to his 
moral framework but that they are constitutive of what he argues to be our moral obligations. 
This has already been answered within the previous two paragraphs. The constitutive 
principle for the supersensible nature of human beings is the categorical imperative, which is 
the central moral authority in Kant's moral theory. We have a duty to act in accordance with 
the universal moral law, succeeding in our duty is to acting virtuously and what ultimately 
characterizes a morally good character, or the good human being, is the autocratic agent. 
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